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COMPETING DEMANDS FOR THE
COLORADO RIVER
DAVID

H. GETCHES*

The Colorado River traverses and collects the water of a vast,
arid region. It drains snowmelt from the western slope of the Rockies
in Colorado and Wyoming, from the Uintas of Utah, from the San
Juans in Colorado and New Mexico, as well as runoff from flashfloods
across the Arizona deserts. The River and its major tributaries-the
Green, the Yampa, the White, the Gunnison, the San Juan, the Little
Colorado, and the Gila-thread country of breathtaking beauty, from
glaciers to sand dunes, city streets to wilderness, timber to sagebrush,
and the highest mountain range to the deepest canyon. In its 1,400mile journey from the Continental Divide to the Gulf of California the
Colorado drops almost 14,000 vertical feet. The River is the drainage
for about one-twelfth of the continental United States but has a virgin
flow about equal to the Delaware River with its relatively tiny
watershed.
The area served by the Colorado is even larger than the area that
contributes to its flows. The River's water is moved far from its watershed to irrigate farm land and quench thirsts in parts of all seven states
it touches. Water is carried across the Continental Divide to the Denver metropolitan area, in canals to the population centers of Arizona,
and by pipeline to San Diego, Los Angeles, and their suburbs. Once
barren deserts have been converted into a cornucopia of year-around
cash crops. Throughout the West, industries are animated and homes
are lighted, heated, and cooled by energy generated by the River's
force. The River and the mountains and valleys where it originates are
playgrounds for people from all over the country and the world. The
finite and annually fluctuating resources of the Colorado are shared by
family-owned ranches, by corporate-owned farm operations, by ski areas, and by mountain towns within its watershed, as well as by homes
* Executive Director, State of Colorado Department of Natural Resources; Associate Professor
(on leave), University of Colorado School of Law. A.B., 1964, Occidental College; J.D., 1967, University of Southern California. Portions of this article are based on a paper prepared by the author and
Charles J. Meyers for the Colorado River Working Symposium, Santa Fe, New Mexico, May, 1983.
The views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the Colorado Department of Natural
Resources.
1. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 552 (1963). The Colorado River drains 247,600 square
miles; the Delaware River drains 17,500 square miles. U.S. Water Resources Council, The Nation's
Water Resources 6-1-4, 6-13-4, 6-14-4 (1968).
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and industries in sprawling cities far from the River's natural reach or
origins. A natural treasure to some, a capital asset to others, it sustains diverse and sometimes competing uses such as fishing and golf
courses, cattle ranching and car washes, kayaking and power plants.
The history of the Colorado is a history of conflict. Competing
users vie for the River's water, insisting that they have the highest
right by virtue of equity, location, natural right, or economicswhatever best serves their interests. Arizona's attempts to prevent
California from monopolizing the River led to a long and bitter feud.
The slower developing Upper Basin states have fought to reserve a
share of the River for their future. Mexico insisted it deserved to have
some water left in the stream to serve farms south of the border. Once
Mexico got American agreement on its entitlement to a quantity of
water, it demanded that the water be of a quality good enough for
irrigation, touching off further conflict. For many years Basin states
competed with one another for federal funds for water development,
only later finding it more fruitful to cooperate.
The most serious conflicts among sovereigns over the Colorado
River have been legally resolved. The River's bounty is now allocated
among states and between the United States and Mexico by a set of
compacts, statutes and court decisions known as the Law of the
River.2 The Law of the River has moderated conflict and imposed
order on chaos. Although interpretive issues may be unavoidable as
the mountain states claim their full share of the River and while potentially huge legal rights of Indian tribes to Colorado River water
remain uncertain, legal controversies among governments will not be
the basis of future tensions over the Colorado.
I believe that conflicts over the Colorado River in the future will
focus on which users and what uses will prevail over others, consistent
with the established Law of the River. The competitors include agriculture, municipalities, recreationists, power customers, naturalists
and Indians. Together they seek more productivity for more people
with virtually no deterioration-perhaps even improvement-in the
aesthetic and ecological values of the River. Achieving these ends demands interstate cooperation and economically beneficial arrangements among public and private entities with interests in the River.
Although innovative and flexible applications of the law and some alteration of state laws will be needed, competing demands can be met
without major changes in the Law of the River. The challenge to
those whose decisions shape the River's future is how to achieve opti2. The leading authority on the law of the Colorado River is Meyers, The Colorado River, 19
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1966).
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mum benefits from an established allocation system for a society
whose needs and values are changing.
The article is in three Sections. The first discusses the historic
apportionment of the Colorado River between the Upper and Lower
Basins and, ultimately, among the seven Basin states and Mexico. It
also addresses possible future legal questions about the interpretation
of laws apportioning the River's water. The second Section identifies
the most significant uses competing for shares of the water. Agriculture, power production, municipal use, Indians, and instream needs
for fish, wildlife and recreation all are competitors for use of the Colorado River. The Section analyzes the nature of future conflicts among
those uses and the potential for accommodating some apparently inconsistent purposes. The final Section considers several approaches to
maximizing the River's capacity to satisfy future demands. The approaches include storage, efficiency measures, controlling salinity,
comprehensive consideration of all available water sources and interstate water marketing. The Section describes some ways in which the
approaches may be used to resolve competing demands in the future.
I. APPORTIONMENT OF THE RIVER
The right to use Colorado River water has been legally apportioned among the seven states through which the River passes by two
interstate compacts, congressional legislation, and interpretive
Supreme Court decisions. Although a few legal issues persist that
could erupt into litigation over aspects of the allocation scheme, it is
reasonable to expect the states to avoid major legal disputes in favor of
practical, negotiated solutions.
A. InterstateAllocations
In the early years of the twentieth century, Southern California's
growing need for federal assistance in building delivery facilities for
Colorado River water came into conflict with the desire of states in the
Upper Basin to secure the right to develop River water for future
needs. Rich farms in California's Imperial Valley were irrigated with
water brought from the River by a canal through Mexico. The Imperial Irrigation District sought the security of an "all-American" canal
that would not leave the Valley's farmers at the mercy of Mexico. The
federal government began investigating the possibilities. At the same
time, rapidly expanding Los Angeles was feeling the need for new
sources of electric power and anticipating new water needs. Leaders
in the Upper Basin states, especially Colorado, objected. They knew
that they would eventually need to develop Colorado River water to
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meet the needs of growing areas like Denver. They feared that if California were allowed to develop the River's water first, it would perfect
a better legal claim. Their fears were justified by contemporary
jurisprudence.
In 1922 it was reasonable to assume that the United States
Supreme Court would recognize greater legal rights in a state that developed water first than in a state developing later. The Court allocates waters of interstate streams by the principle of "equitable
apportionment." 3 The Court applied the doctrine of prior appropriation in a 1922 equitable apportionment between Colorado and Wyoming, both of which use prior appropriation to allocate water within
the states.4 Interstate apportionment of the Colorado River under
that approach could have resulted in the Upper Basin states getting
very little water.
The 1922 Colorado River Compact' was intended to strike an
accommodation between the expanding demands of the Lower Basin
and the desire to preserve adequate water for future use in the less
developed Upper Basin, the source of virtually all the River's water.
Compacts had been used to settle or avoid conflicts between states on
other issues since the signing of the Constitution, but the Colorado
River Compact was the first compact negotiated to resolve claims to
an interstate stream. 6 The Compact enabled construction of storage
facilities to protect the Lower Basin from floods and allowed the
Lower Basin to use water needed for a growing population. The Up3. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
4. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). Later the Court modified its approach to require
consideration of a variety of factors. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945):

Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many
factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and climatic condi-

tions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate
of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream junior] areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are
all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests
which must be made.
325 U.S. at 618.
5. Congress authorized compact negotiation by the Act of Aug. 19, 1921, ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171.
The Compact was approved by Congress in § 13(a) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, ch. 42,
43 U.S.C. § 6170) (1982). It was proclaimed by President Hoover on June 25, 1929, 46 Stat. 3000. See
Wilbur & Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, H.R. Doc. No. 717, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 22. The Constitution provides that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State ....
1"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. A similar clause was included in Article VI of the Articles of
Confederation.
6. See J. MuYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND FEDERALINTERSTATE COMPACT, National Water Commission Legal Study No. 14 (1971).
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per Basin states relied on the Compact to prevent River water from

being monopolized by California and Arizona through the establishment of legal priorities.
Under the Compact the waters of the Colorado River were apportioned on an essentially equal basis between the Upper Basin statesColorado, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico-and the Lower Basin

states-Arizona, California and Nevada. The Compact guaranteed
the Lower Basin states a flow of 75,000,000 acre-feet over a progressive series of ten-year periods.7 The drafters intended that Article
III(a) would give each Basin, Upper and Lower, an average of

7,500,000 acre-feet a year. In addition, under Article III(b) the Lower
Basin may consume another 1,000,000 acre-feet in years when flows
permit. Article III(e) allows the faster developing Lower Basin to use
7.

Article III of the Compact states:
(a) There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado River System in perpetuity to the
Upper Basin and to the Lower Basin respectively the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of
7,500,000 acre feet of water per annum, which shall include all water necessary for the supply
of any rights which may now exist.
(b) In addition to the apportionment in paragraph (a) the Lower Basin is hereby given
the right to increase its beneficial consumptive use of such waters by one million acre per
annum.
(c) If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall hereafter
recognize in the United States or Mexico any right to the use of any waters of the Colorado
River System, such waters shall be supplied first from the waters which are surplus over and
above the aggregate of the quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus
shall prove insufficient for this purpose, then, the burden of such deficiency shall be equally
borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the
Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency so recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d).
(d) The States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to
be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre feet for any period of ten consecutive years
reckoned in continuing progressive series beginning with the first day of October next succeeding the ratification of this compact.
(e) The States of the Upper Division shall not withhold water, and the States of the
Lower Division shall not require the delivery of water, which cannot reasonably be applied to
domestic and agricultural uses.
(f) Further equitable apportionment of the beneficial uses of the waters of the Colorado

River System unapportioned by paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) may be made in the manner provided in paragraph (g) at any time after October 1, 1963, if and when either basin shall have
reached its total beneficial consumptive use as set out in paragraphs (a) and (b).
(g) In the event of a desire for a further apportionment as provided in paragraph (f) any
two signatory States, acting through their Governors, may give joint notice of such desire to
the Governors of the other signatory States and to the President of the United States of
America, and it shall be the duty of the Governor of the signatory states and of the President
of the United States of America forthwith to appoint representatives, whose duty it shall be to
divide and apportion equitably between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin the beneficial use of
the unapportioned water of the Colorado River System as mentioned in paragraph (f), subject
to the Legislative ratification of the signatory States and the Congress of the United States of
America.
COLO. REv.STAT. § 37-61-101 (1973).
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any water the Upper Basin cannot use. Further, under Article Ill(c),
the two basins are to share equally any burden that might be imposed
to deliver water to Mexico, an obligation later set at 1,500,000 acrefeet annually.'
The water apportioned to the two basins was later allocated to
individual states. In 1949, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
gave each Upper Basin state a percentage share of that Basin's apportionment. 9 California, Arizona, and Nevada, however, were unable to
agree on how to divide the Lower Basin share. After years of intense
dispute and litigation, Congress enacted legislation making federal financing of Hoover Dam contingent on a prescribed Lower Basin allocation formula. Later the Supreme Court found that the Act had
effectively apportioned the water.10
Water from the Colorado was not divided among the seven Basin
states based on the amount of water each contributes to the River's
flow. Indeed, state portions bear no relation to state contributions.
STATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO RIVER FLOW AND APPORTIONMENTS
OF RIVER WATER (PERCENTAGES)

Arizona
California
Colorado
Nevada
New Mexico
Utah

Wyoming

Contribution
to Flow"'
1
71
1
15

11

Apportionment
of Water 2
20.7
30.6
24.3
2.1
5.5
10.8

6.6

8. The obligation to Mexico was quantified in the Treaty with Mexico, T.S. No. 994, 59 Stat. 1219

(1944).
9. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 33 (1949). The states received the
following shares: Colorado, 51.75%; Utah, 23%; Wyoming, 14%; New Mexico, 11.25%; Arizona,
50,000 acre-feet.
10. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The Court held that allocation of the Lower
Basin share is governed by the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617f (1982). The Act
gives Arizona 2.8 million acre-feet, California 4.4 million acre-feet, and Nevada 300,000 acre-feet of the
first 7.5 million acre-feet. Deliveries in excess of such amounts are apportioned 46 percent to Arizona,

50 percent to California and 4 percent to Nevada.
11. Portion of the total flow at Lee Ferry added from runoff occurring within the state, based on
historical information in UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN COMPACT COMMISSION, RECORD, vol. 2,
Meeting No. 7, 19 (1948). Figures assume no significant runoff is added to the River below Lee Ferry.
12. Calculations assume a total flow that would allow 16 million acre-feet to be divided between
the two basins. State shares are determined using allocations found in the Colorado River Compact,
U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, I FEDERAL RECLAMATION AND RELATED LAWS ANNOTATED 441-445

(1972), and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949), the Boulder Canyon
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The allocation scheme in the 1922 Compact was to give the two
basins equitable shares of available water. It is now apparent that the
apportionment was made on the incorrect assumption that there
would be an average annual flow of at least 16,000,000 acre-feet.1 3
Data spanning three centuries, however, reveal an average annual flow
of only about 13,500,000 acre-feet.' 4 Furthermore, annual flows have

been erratic, ranging from 4,400,000 acre-feet to over 22,000,000 acrefeet. 5 The erroneous assumption about average flows resulted in the
Lower Basin's being guaranteed substantial minimum deliveries by the
Upper Basin, leaving far less water available for Upper Basin use than
the negotiators apparently expected.
The Compact contemplates storage facilities to smooth out fluctuating flows and to allow for the average annual usage described in Articles III(a) and III(b). Adequate storage exists on the River to
protect Lower Basin Compact entitlements except in the most severe
and prolonged drought. Lake Mead, behind Hoover Dam, can hold
27,400,000 acre-feet. Lake Powell has a capacity of 25,000,000 acre-

feet. Together, all reservoirs in the Colorado River system have a storage capacity of 62,489,200 acre-feet.1 6 With sixty percent of this storage effectively inaccessible to Upper Basin users, however, the burdens
of cyclical water shortages fall largely on the Upper Basin. These inherent burdens, as well as practical limits on Upper Basin storage,

should inform Compact interpretation. For instance, Article III(e)
says that the Upper Basin may not withhold water from Lower Basin
Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1982), and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). For
the percentages and amounts, see supra notes 9 and 10.
13. Articles III(a) and (b) of the Compact contemplated annual use of up to 16 million acre-feet.
That a surplus was contemplated is shown by Article III(c) which allowed for further allocation of river
water for Mexico and Articles III(f) and 111(g) which provide for later equitable apportionment by
further compact of water not otherwise allocated by the Compact. Furthermore, Article I makes it
clear that the Compact signatories thought they were only making "an apportionment of the use of part
(emphasis added) COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101
of the water of the Colorado River System .
(1973).
There is some evidence that the negotiators thought the river could supply as much as 21 million
acre-feet per year. See S. RIFKIND, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA
(U.S. 1960) (approved in part, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)), at 17 n.56. In fact, the
progressive ten-year running average peaked about the time the Compact was signed. From 1933 to
1983 there was only one year (1950) in which the ten-year progressive running average flow at Lee
Ferry reached 15 million acre-feet. It rose to 15.8 million acre-feet in 1984. Average annual virgin flow
for the period since the Compact, 1922 to 1982, has been 14.2 million acre-feet, and since 1930 it has
been only 13.8 million acre-feet. UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION, THIRTY-SIxTH ANNUAL
REPORT 21-27 Salt Lake City, Utah, 1984.
14. Weatherford & Jacoby, Impact of Energy Development on the Law of the ColoradoRiver, 13
NAT. RESOURCES J. 171, 183-85 (1975). The authors explain a study of tree ring widths and reconstructed virgin flow data to develop estimates going back to 1570.
15. S. RIFKIND, supra note 13, at 18.
16. UPPER COLORADO RVER COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 10-11.
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uses unless it can "reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural
uses." But the provision should not be read to preclude storage of
water to meet future compact delivery requirements under Article
III(d) or for reasonably foreseeable Upper Basin needs.
Some scientists predict that climatic changes could alter historic
precipitation patterns, and reduce available water supplies. Carbon dioxide loading of the atmosphere caused by fossil-fuel combustion,
mostly in coal-burning power plants, threatens a significant climate
change. The amount of CO 2 in the atmosphere is increasing rapidly.

These concentrations could double in the next sixty-five years causing
what is commonly known as the "greenhouse effect."' 7 A National
Academy of Sciences report estimates that the resulting temperature
increase and reduction in precipitation could diminish water supplies
by almost forty percent in the Upper Colorado River region.' 8 Intensified droughts would exacerbate water problems of the Basin states,
especially in the Upper Basin.
The ultimate problem for the Upper Basin is how to build a future on the right to leftovers. The issue has not yet been presented
sharply, however, because Upper Basin uses have not approached the
legal or natural limits on water supplies. 9 But the Lower Basin states
have present uses for a larger share of water than their Compact entitlements. Although the Compact was to allow each basin to develop
at its own pace, with a share of water guaranteed when development
occurs, 20 some Upper Basin interests fear that the Lower Basin's

"temporary" reliance on this water could ripen into necessity and ultimately into recognized rights. Such a result would abrogate the Compact under precisely the circumstances the drafters intended to
address-later development of the Upper Basin apportionment, after
temporary Lower Basin use. Although the Compact should provide
solid legal protection for its future uses, the Upper Basin remains concerned with losing some of its apportionment from adverse Compact
interpretations that may be influenced by a growing Lower Basin dependence on the lion's share of the River's water.
17.

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GLOBAL Fu-

TURE TIME TO ACT: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON GLOBAL RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT AND POP-

ULATION 137-38 (1981).
18. Revelle & Waggoner, Effects ofa CarbonDioxide-Induced ClimaticChange on Water Supplies
in the Western United States, in CHANGING CLIMATE, REPORT OF THE CARBON DIOXIDE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE 423 (1983).
19. Total consumptive water use from the Colorado River in the Upper Basin was 3.5 million
acre-feet in 1980. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, QUALITY OF WATER, COLORADO RIVER BASIN, PROGRESS REPORT No.

11, at 10 (1983).

20. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555-59 (1963).
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B. Compact Interpretation
Several issues of Compact construction are unresolved.21 Some
have to do with the nature of the Upper Basin's obligation to participate in fulfilling the United States' obligation to deliver water to Mexico. Another issue, the interpretion of "beneficial consumptive use" in
the Compact, bears on how much water can be consumed in the Upper Basin. An historic unanswered question is whether the flow of the
Gila River, which is consumed exclusively in Arizona, should be
counted against the Lower Basin's apportionment. If so, it could have
a dramatic effect on allocation of water. Finally, the Upper Basin
states could argue that the Colorado River Compact should be reformed based on a mutual mistake of fact-the assumption that much
more water annually flows in the Colorado than historical records can
justify.
1. Mexican Treaty Issues
The Mexican Treaty and the related Compact provision lack clarity, leaving them open to a variety of constructions. In 1944, the
United States entered into a treaty promising to deliver 1,500,000
acre-feet to Mexico annually.2 2 The drafters of the Colorado River
Compact anticipated that possibility, and said in Article III(c) that if
any Mexican rights could not be adequately supplied from "surplus,"
the Upper and Lower Basins would be obliged to share the burdens
equally. How the words of the two documents are parsed and applied
affects the amount of water the Upper Basin ultimately may use.
It is not clear what the Compact means by "surplus." The provision arguably requires the Upper Basin to make annual deliveries to
Mexico of one-half the total American obligation, or 750,000 acre-feet,
but the language states a more limited obligation. Article III(c) says
that the first source for supplying Mexico is water which is "surplus
over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in paragraphs
(a) and (b)" (i.e., 16,000,000 acre-feet a year). To the extent there is
inadequate "surplus" water, "the burden of such deficiency shall be
borne equally by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin." When no
water above 16,000,000 acre-feet is available in a particular year, the
two basins must meet the shortfall equally from their Compact apportionments regardless of how much water each is actually using that
year. This indicates that the Upper Basin need not reduce its present
21. Several of the interpretive problems regarding interbasin obligations and rights are discussed
elsewhere. See Meyers, supra note 2, at 12-26; MEYERS, Conflicts Between the Upper and Lower Basins
on the Colorado River, in RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: FRONTIERS FOR RESEARCH 113 (1960).
22. See Treaty, supra note 8.
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uses or even refrain from storage for reasonable domestic and agricultural uses until they total 7,500,000 acre-feet a year. Because the Upper Basin is unlikely to need 7,500,000 acre-feet for its own immediate
use in most years, the shared obligation for Mexican deliveries may
require the Lower Basin to curtail present uses while the Upper Basin
curtails only storage. The Lower Basin is protected by Article III(e),
which prohibits the Upper Basin from withholding water which it cannot reasonably apply to domestic and agricultural uses. This provision
should allow the Upper Basin to store water out of its 7,500,000 acrefoot share to protect its reasonable domestic and agricultural uses
against fluctuations in supplies, but not to hoard huge amounts of
water while the Lower Basin curbs present uses. In practice, the
Lower Basin could replace the water it delivers to Mexico under Article III(c) at the expense of present uses, with water demanded from
the Upper Basin under Article III(e), thus reducing the significance of
the issue.
A second question is whether the Mexican Treaty obligation requires annual deliveries from the Upper Basin. The Compact requires
an aggregate ten-year flow at Lee Ferry, the dividing point between
Upper and Lower Basins, located near the Utah-Arizona border. But
the Treaty promises Mexico an annual delivery. In years when more
than 7,500,000 acre-feet are delivered at Lee Ferry, the Upper Basin
gets credit toward its ten-year, 75,000,000 acre-feet delivery requirement. But does the Upper Basin get credit against its duty to contribute to the Mexican Treaty obligation? A practical solution would be
to allow the Upper Basin credit toward future Mexican obligations for
excess deliveries at Lee Ferry if the water could physically be stored in
the Lower Basin or was actually consumed by the Lower Basin (rather
than simply being released by the Upper Basin because of inadequate
storage space or to generate power). Water over and above 7,500,000
acre-feet a year delivered to the Lower Basin which can neither be
used nor stored (because storage space is unavailable) should not be
credited against future Upper Basin obligations to Mexico. The
United States gets no credit from Mexico for overdeliveries and
neither should the Upper Basin unless the Lower Basin can benefit
from it.
A third Mexican Treaty issue is where the Upper Basin must deliver the share of water it owes to Mexico. The Upper Basin says that
it is sufficient for it to deliver 750,000 acre-feet (the Upper Basin's onehalf share of 1,500,000 acre-feet promised in the Treaty) at Lee Ferry.
The Lower Basin states argue that enough water must be delivered by
the Upper Basin at Lee Ferry to make an effective delivery of 750,000
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acre-feet at the Mexican border. Because there are significant channel
losses and evaporation between Lee Ferry and the Mexican border, the
difference is great. The Upper Basin can argue persuasively that no
water must be delivered at Lee Ferry to compensate for transit losses
because availability of the 750,000 acre-feet from Lee Ferry to the
Mexican border benefits the Lower Basin by giving it opportunities for
reuse and greater hydroelectric power generating capacity. This argument is less apt if the Upper Basin has voluntarily released excess
water in a prior year that is stored in the Lower Basin and for which
the Upper Basin has received credit against future Mexican Treaty
delivery requirements. Under those circumstances, the Upper Basin
indirectly benefits from the storage in the Lower Basin and perhaps
should deliver additional water to compensate for storage losses due to
evaporation and other causes.
2. The Meaning of "Beneficial Consumptive Use"
The Compact apportions the "beneficial consumptive use" of
amounts of water specified in Article III(a) and (b) but the term is not
defined. If the states can salvage and use water naturally lost to the
stream without it counting against their apportionments, greater use
can be made of the same water. One view is that the phrase means net
depletions-the amount by which the natural flow is depleted by
human activity. Another is that "beneficial consumptive use" should
be the sum of all diversions less any returns to the stream. The latter
method counts as beneficially consumed all water that is naturally lost
to the system, such as seepage to groundwater, evaporation, and
evapotranspiration. The former method, net depletion, would charge
the user only for losses that would not have occurred in nature. For
instance, if an Upper Basin state diverted 1,000,000 acre-feet and consumed it all, the diversions less return flow formula would charge
1,000,000 acre-feet against the state's Compact entitlement. The net
depletion method would charge the state with using only the portion
that was not consumed or lost in a state of nature. Thus, if it could be
shown that thirty percent of water in the River at the place of diversion historically was consumed by evaporation, evapotranspiration
and other natural causes before it reached Lee Ferry, only seventy percent, or 700,000 acre-feet of the 1,000,000 acre-feet consumed would
be counted against the state's Compact apportionment.
The Lower Basin states may argue that "diversions less return
flows" should be used to measure beneficial consumptive use, fearing
that the net depletion approach would result in less water being avail-
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able after Upper Basin uses. In Arizona v. California,2 3 the United
States Supreme Court construed consumptive use in the Boulder Canyon Project Act 24 to mean "diversions less returns to the river" in
allocating the Lower Basin apportionment among the states.2 5 The
Court, however, has never interpreted beneficial consumptive use
within the meaning of the 1922 Compact apportioning waters between
the two basins.
The Upper Basin states can get more benefit from their apportionment if the net depletion formula is used. Water saved by avoiding
or eliminating natural causes of losses can be beneficially used without
being "consumed," i.e., without diminishing virgin flow. The Upper
Basin must be able to maximize use of its apportionment because the
Compact requires it to shoulder the burdens of fluctuating natural
supplies. The Lower Basin is adequately protected by its entitlement
to a certain ten-year aggregate of water deliveries.
The argument that the net depletion formula should apply in the
Upper Basin is bolstered by the fact that the Upper Basin Compact
divides the Upper Basin's apportionment among Upper Basin states by
effectively applying a net depletion formula. Calculation of state
shares is by the "inflow-outflow method" which is based on man-made
depletions of virgin flow (i.e., not natural losses) at Lee Ferry. 6
3. The Gila River
A lingering issue is whether waters apportioned by the Compact
include all tributaries. The Gila River joins the mainstem of the Colorado River in Arizona near the Mexican border. It produces more
than 2,000,000 acre-feet of water a year, much of which flows beneath
its bed and is extracted by wells. Almost all of its flow is now consumed in Arizona; virtually none reaches the mainstem.2 7 If the flow
of the Gila were considered in satisfaction of apportionments to the
Lower Basin and to Arizona, it could greatly affect rights and obligations among the states. It would not alter the Upper Basin's 1922
Compact obligation to deliver 75,000,000 acre-feet at Lee Ferry each
ten years; but use of water from the Gila could be counted against the
Lower Basin's allowable annual beneficial consumptive use, and its
flows could be considered available to meet the treaty obligation to
23. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
24. 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a) (1982).
25. 373 U.S. at 557 n.23. The Court approved the Report of the Special Master which referred to
the formula in describing the Compact. Meyers, supra note 2, at 19.
26. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949).
27.

N. HUNDLEY, WATER AND THE WEsT: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLI-

TICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEsT (1975).
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Mexico. The 1,000,000 acre-feet allocated to the Lower Basin by Article III(b) of the Compact (in addition to the 7,500,000 in Article
III(a)) is not subject to delivery at Lee Ferry and thus should be satisfied by the Gila's flows used in Arizona.
The status of the Gila under the Compact has never been determined. One of Arizona's reasons for its steadfast refusal to ratify the
Colorado River Compact was uncertainty over its rights to water from
the Gila.28 The Colorado River System is defined in Article II(a) as
"the portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within the
United States of America." Article I of the Compact says that the
purpose of the Compact was "to provide for the equitable division and
apportionment of the use of the Colorado River System," indicating
that the Gila's waters should be included in the apportionment. However, in Arizona v. California,California contended unsuccessfully that
the water of the Gila should be counted against Arizona's apportionment under the Boulder Canyon Project Act.2 9 California sought to
benefit from greater "surpluses" which it splits equally with Arizona
under the Act. The United States Supreme Court held that the Act
allocated mainstem water, not the Gila.30 The case dealt only with an
allocation among Lower Basin states under the Act, and consequently
whether the Gila is apportioned under the Colorado River Compact
remains an open question.
4. Mutual Mistake
The Upper Basin could assert that its Compact obligation should
be avoided or reformed because of a mutual mistake of fact. The apportionment in the Compact was based on an assumed average annual
runnoff skewed by a few extraordinarily wet years just before 1922.3"
The magnitude of potential effects of the mistake on the Upper Basin
is great. Reformation of the Compact under contract law principles3 2
to reflect accurate runoff statistics and follow the Compact negotiators' approach of dividing the right to use water essentially equally,
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 238-42; Meyers, supra note 2, at 41.
43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617f (1982).
373 U.S. at 568.
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152. "Interstate compacts are not only stat-

utes; they are also contracts. This means that the substantive law of contracts is applicable to them." F.

ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 2 (1961). See also
West Virginia ex rel Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951), and Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) I

(1823), where the Supreme Court considered interstate compacts to be "contracts" within the meaning
of the Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 prohibition on laws impairing the obligation of contract. See also Frankfurter
and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution- A Study in InterstateAdjustments, 34 YALE L.J.
685 (1925).
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could reduce the Upper Basin obligation to the Lower Basin by more
than 1,000,000 acre-feet a year.
Although each of the legal questions discussed above, and
others,3 3 bears on the allocation of Colorado River water between the
Upper and Lower Basins, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress is
likely to upset existing uses and expectations. While Congress could
take unilateral action to revise or interpret the Compact 34 the pros-

pects are slight absent demonstrable injustice.35 The United States
Supreme Court could also address whether the Compact departed
from the principle of equitable apportionment, 36 but it has already accepted the allocations in the Compact as the backdrop for Arizona v.
California.37 Ideally, problems concerning the allocation and management of River resources should be resolved by the mutual agreement
of the states. Matters going beyond interpretation of existing law, of
course, would require new compacts and the consent of Congress.
The affected states can determine better than Congress or the Court
how to get the most use and benefits from the Colorado River. It is
not in their interest to leave matters of such great importance to the
33. For example, it is unclear whether the 1922 Compact, or the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact of 1948, apportioned the White River in Colorado.
34. Congress does not surrender or limit its sovereign power by consenting to an interstate compact. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433 (1856). Congress never
has modified an "equitable apportionment" made by compact but it has departed from compact language to assert federal interests. The Colorado River Compact states in article IV that the river is no
longer navigable and that other uses are to take priority over navigation. Congress later asserted its
navigation power in connection with the Boulder Canyon Project Act in Arizona v. California, 283 U.S.
423 (1931).
The commerce clause furnishes ample power for Congress to modify a compact. See Frankfurter
& Landis, supra note 34, at 684, 685. See also Comment, CongressionalSupervision of Interstate Compacts," 75 YALE L.J. 1416 (1966).
Congressional power to legislate to solve interstate water problems was recognized in Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), and Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
35. The Court has regularly declined to exercise its original jurisdiction in the absence of present
or imminent harm. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907).
36. Interstate water compacts are to effectuate the equitable apportionment doctrine, and the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine their validity. See Hinderlider v. La Plata and Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1938).
The Court's original jurisdiction over interstate disputes, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,cl.
2,could be
invoked to determine whether the Colorado River Compact should be enforced to produce an inequitable result when its assumed "equity" was based on a mutual mistake. See also Cuyler v. Adams, 449
U.S. 433 (1981); Comment, FederalQuestion Jurisdictionto Interpret Interstate Compacts, 64 GEo. L.J.
87 (1975). Contra, Engdahl, Characterizationof InterstateAgreements: When is a Compact Not a Compact, 64 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1965); Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compact" A QuestionableFederal Question, 51 VA. L. REV. 987 (1965).
37. The Court discussed the events leading up to the Compact and outlined its provisions as part
of the facts of the case. 373 U.S. at 552.
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vicissitudes of the national political process or the uncertainties of adjudication among adversary positions.

II. COMPETING USES
A. Agriculture vs. Municipal and Industrial Uses
Economic forces call for a switch from agricultural to municipal
and industrial uses. The Law of the River bristles with preferences for
agriculture. 8 Congress authorized expenditures of billions of dollars
for a network of dams and delivery systems which were proposed to
assist agriculture. 39 Nevertheless, several water projects, while primarily intended to benefit agriculture, drew essential political support because they would eventually provide for growing urban centers.
Southern California's need for water and electric power in the Twen4
ties was a significant factor in the struggle to authorize Hoover Dam. 0
Urban needs have given popularity and political viability to the most
recent developments on the River, too, such as the Central Arizona
Project which will serve the growing Phoenix and Tucson areas.41
Nevertheless, the authorizing legislation for the project recites agricultural preferences.42
Demographic and economic changes in the Colorado River region alter the nature of demands for water. Thus, the relative importance of agriculture in the Colorado River Basin is declining as
agriculture has ceased to expand significantly and urban growth
abounds. Urban population growth from 1970-80 in six of the seven
Basin states ranged from thirty-three percent to seventy-three percent.43 The Water Resources Council estimated that agricultural
38. One of the purposes listed in Article I of the Colorado River Compact is "to secure the
expeditious agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin." Further, the Compact in Article 111(e) makes water delivery rights and obligations of the Basin states dependent on
whether they can apply the water to "domestic and agricultural uses." Article IV(b) provides that
impounding water for power purposes is subservient to the use and consumption of such water for
agricultural and domestic purposes. Likewise, Article IV(a) provides that agricultural and power purposes are preferred over uses for the purpose of navigation. See supra note 7. The Upper Colorado
River Basin Compact provides in Article XV that agricultural and domestic uses are preferred to storage for power generation.
39. In the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1982), Congress provided that no
charge could be made for water used in the Imperial or Coachella Valleys for irrigation from Hoover
Dam. The Colorado River Basin Project Act declares that one of the purposes of the Central Arizona
Project and several others is to provide "for the storage and delivery of the waters of the Colorado
River for reclamation of lands...." 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982). Similar declarations are in the Colorado
River Storage Project Act that authorized most of the Upper Basin projects, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1982),
and in the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-18 (1982).
40. N. HUNDLEY, supra note 27, at 250-52.
41. Sudman, The Central Arizona Project, 4 WESTERN WATER (May/June 1985).
42. 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982).
43. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

water consumption nationally can be expected to drop from eightythree percent to seventy percent of total water usage, although it will
increase in absolute terms. 44 It is expected to decrease in both relative
and absolute terms in Colorado River Basin states.4 5
Population centers outside the Colorado River Basin, like Los
Angeles, San Diego, Denver, Phoenix, Tucson,' 6 and Salt Lake City,

now draw heavily on the River. More than half of the United States'
consumption of Colorado River water is outside the Basin. 7 Municipal and industrial users can afford to pay enough to make it advantageous for farmers and ranchers in the Basin to sell their rights plus pay
the cost of transporting the water hundreds of miles over mountainous
divides.
Even in rural areas of the Upper Basin, increased water demands

are projected for industrial development.'

Energy-related uses in the

West that are directly and indirectly increasing the demand for water

in rural areas include mines, oil and gas wells, power plants,' 9 coal
slurry lines,5 ° oil shale projects,5" and coal gasification plants.52 Such
POPULATION, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 4-7, 6-7, 7-7, 30-7, 33-7, 46-7, 52-7 (1982).

California's urban growth was 19 percent..
44. UNITED STATES WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, I THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES 1975-

2000 at 31 (1978).
45. Id.
46. Phoenix and Tucson are technically within the Colorado River drainage. They are in the Gila
River watershed which has for many years contributed nothing to the river's flow in the mainstream.
Thus these cities can be considered effectively outside the Basin.
47. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER
PROBLEMS: HOW TO REDUCE THEIR IMPACT, GAO Report No. B-122053, LED-79-1 1, at 9 (1979).

48. Stegner, The ColoradoRiver is a River No More, Rocky Mountain News, June 14, 1981, at 87.
49. Electric power generation uses water for cooling in coal-fired power plants. Estimates of
consumptive use run as high as 14,400 acre-feet per year for a 1,000 megawatt plant. C. BORIS & J.
KRUTILLA, WATER RIGHTS AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE YELLOWSTONE RIVER BASIN 104-

14 (1980).
50. Coal slurry pipelines, used to transport pulverized coal by mixing it with water, can draw
large quantities of water. Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI) purchased 50,000 acre-feet per
year of water from South Dakota for a proposed pipeline that was to run from a Wyoming mine to load
centers in Louisiana and Arkansas. When government approvals of the project were set aside by a
federal court, Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Neb. 1984) (appeal pending), the project was
dropped. Denver Post, Aug. 2, 1984, at El, col. 1.
51. Oil shale development requires large quantities of water. For a 50,000 barrel per day project
it is estimated that 5,000 to 8,000 acre-feet of water per year is needed. Office of the Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Natural Resources, The Availability of Waterfor Oil Shale and Coal Gasification Development in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 5-4 (October 1979). See also Lewis, Oil from
Shale: The Potential, the Problem and Plan for Development, 5 ENERGY 373 (1980), (5500-6400 acrefeet per year for 50,000 barrels per day); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, AN
ASSESSMENT OF OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES 364 (Government Printing Office, 1980) (5000-13,000

acre-feet per year for 50,000 barrels per day plant).
52. A coal gasification project could take 6,000 acre-feet per year to produce 250 million cubic
feet per day of gas. Coal mining itself consumes some water, perhaps 500 acre-feet per year for a mine
that produces 10 million tons per year. C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, supra note 51, at 98-104.
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uses justify far higher prices for water than irrigators now pay. The

Western States Water Council reported in 1977 that while most western agriculture is based on water costing under twenty dollars an acrefoot, coal-burning electric power plants can pay between $1,200 and

$16,300 an acre-foot for cooling water.5 3 The prices paid by different
enterprises are limited by the value water adds to their products. A

1962 study of the Rio Grande Basin showed that the value added in
agriculture was $44-$51 per acre-foot; in recreation, $212-$307 per

54
acre-foot; in industry, $3,040-$3,989 per acre-foot.
Although strong economic forces may influence the shift away
from irrigated agriculture, legal and political forces may discourage
transactions. Outright transfer restrictions have been repealed by
most states, yet transfers remain inhibited by a number of state laws.55
Most western states now "freely" allow transfers and changes of water
rights, but require the applicant to show that no other water user, jun-

ior or senior, will be injured by the change. Proof of no injury can

56
require costly experts, imposing a considerable transaction cost.

Cumbersome and expensive procedures and substantive requirements
deter transfers of rights to valuable, more efficient uses. 57 In addition,
federal projects operate under reclamation laws that erect barriers to
market transfers of water.58
53. WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, WATER FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, Update 1977 17

(1977). Some charges for irrigation water are actually much lower. The 1983 rate for the Grand Valley
Water Users Association in Colorado was $3.20 an acre-foot. Telephone interview with Bill Klapwyk,
Manager-Treasurer, Grand Valley Water Users Association (May 4, 1984). The Yuma County Water
Users Association in Arizona charged $7 an acre-foot in 1982. 1983 Public Rate Notice, Yuma County
Water Users Association (November, 1982).
54. N. WOLLMAN, THE VALUE OF WATER IN ALTERNATIVE USES 17 (1962).
55. Nebraska imposes severe restraints on transfers of irrigation rights. See Yuetter, A LegalEconomic Critique of Nebraska Watercouse Law, 44 NEB. L. REV. 11, 35 (1965). Wyoming's nochange rule (WYo. STAT. § 41-3-101) is still on the books but has been all but swallowed by exceptions.
Gould, Conversion ofAgricultural Rights to Industrial Use, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1791,
1804-05 (1982). Other statutes allow transfers only if water use on the original land becomes impracticable, and then only with administrative approval. Eg., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 533.040, 533.325 (1984);
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 46-5-34 to 46-5-36 (1982).
56. See, e.g., Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d
629 (1954).
57. See L. HARTMAN & D. SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS (1970); A. KNEESE & F. BROWN, SOUTHWEST UNDER STRESS 89-94
(1981); WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION, AND
MARKETS 215-23 (G. Weatherford ed. 1982); Comment, Water Law - Legal Impediments to Transfers
of Water Rights, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 433 (1967).
58. Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Right" A Case Study in FederalSubsidy Policy, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 13 (1965), points out three such barriers: 1) the prohibition against the sale of reclamation water
rights for use on more than a certain number of acres in single ownership, 43 U.S.C. § 431; 2) the
requirement that users of such water be bona fide residents of the land, 43 U.S.C. § 431; and 3) the
condition that reclamation water be appurtenant to the land, 43 U.S.C. 372. See also Ellis & DuMars,
The Two-Tiered Market in Western Water, 57 NEB. L. REV. 333 (1978); Pring & Edelman, Reclama-
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Legal obstacles to changing water use from agricultural to municipal and industrial uses are inspired, at least in part, by a desire to
protect farming and ranching interests. Many state laws expressly
limit the conversion of water rights from agricultural to industrial
uses. While such laws may tend to preserve agriculture, they are contrary to the interests of farmers who want to sell their rights.5 9
There are also noneconomic reasons for political sentiment favoring agricultural preservation. 60 A strong pro-agriculture spirit lives in
the breast of western society. The Jeffersonian ideal of a nation of
family farmers became a bastion of our culture. In a very real sense
our heritage is rooted in rural America. The existence of rural societies and the open expanses they inhabit are valuable for more than
agricultural production. Even though the electorate is concentrated in
the cities, 61 urban dwellers are willing to bear some burdens of protecting rural areas. 62 Western politicians continue to champion farm preservation while economically more beneficial industrial or municipal
uses compete for water.6 3
Agriculture enjoys substantial economic subsidies when using irrigation water from government-financed facilities. Project costs are
repaid interest free or at below market rates and amortized over an
tion Law Constraints on Energy/Industrial Uses of Western Water, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 297
(1975).
59. Gould, supra note 55, at 1807-08.
60. "[A]gricultural preservation can be clearly identified as one societal interest which gives purpose to one class of impediments to water transfers." A. KNEESE & F. BROWN, supra note 57, at 92.
"Although preservation of agriculture is often dismissed as a romantic notion that frustrates the transfer of water to higher economic uses, it is a goal which enjoys wide support on non-economic, social
grounds." Comment, Do State Restrictions on Water Use By Slurry Pipelines Violate the Commerce
Clause? 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 669 (1982). See also Weatherford, supra note 57, at 195-96; WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, WATER FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, UPDATE

1977 at 17 (1977).

61. In the Colorado River Basin states, the following percentages of the total state population are
located in cities of 10,000 or more: Arizona, 92%; California, 88%; Colorado, 74%; Nevada, 78%;

New Mexico, 59%; Utah, 77%; Wyoming, 45%. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

supra note 43.

62. Denver Post, November 4, 1979, at 25, col. 1 & 5:
Why Colorado, a rapidly changing state with a predominantly urban population, should be
behaving this way [opposing a project to bring rural water to Denver] is something of a mystery. It has a lot to do with what has been primarily an agricultural state; with the fact of too
many past boom and bust periods, making the state value the stabilizing influence of an agricultural economy; and with a perennial desire of Westerners to watch the desert bloom.
63. A journalist recalled a conversation with former Colorado Congressman Wayne Aspinall:
I then asked him if it made sense to tie up so much of Colorado's scarce water in some
irrigation projects which will contribute virtually nothing to the nation as a whole but which
might inhibit future growth in other parts of the state, not to mention their effects on the
environment. His answer was essentially that Colorado is first and foremost an agricultural
state, and that there would be plenty of water in the future for everyone.
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extended period.' 4 Hydroelectric power revenues from the projects
are applied to defray much of the cost of irrigation water. Also, the
value of flood control, navigation, and other public benefits may be
overstated, thereby reducing the repayment obligation of irrigators.6 5
Environmental costs are often ignored and alternative uses such as industrial, municipal, wildlife, recreation, and aesthetics are rarely considered fully.6 6 Under state laws, special districts formed to operate
reclamation projects may issue tax exempt bonds and are exempt from
property and other taxes.6 7
Economic and social change dictate that much of the heavy Colorado River water use for agriculture will gradually shift to other uses.
Legal barriers to market forces and subsidies will slow but not prevent
such changes. Some retarding of changes to alternate uses may effectively reflect important values surrounding agriculture which lack adequate protection in the marketplace.6 8
B. Power Production
Hydroelectric power generation was not a primary purpose for
constructing most of the dams on the Colorado, but demand for inexpensive power and a drive to secure revenues from the projects have
brought their operation into conflict with other uses. Dams constructed and operated by the federal government on the Colorado
River generate some 3,700,000 kilowatts a year. 69 The government
recovered $205 million for power sales in 1982,70 while charging far
below the market rate.71 Irrigators and municipal users believe that
the dams should be operated to maximize water storage and ensure
deliveries of compact entitlements. Releases of water to maintain
maximum power generation can draw down stored water supplies.
Recreational users, and businesses serving them, object to dam operations that radically affect periodic flows to produce lucrative peak-load
64. Comment, Reclamation Subsidies and Their Present-Day Impact, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 497,
518-20.
65. Comment, Desert Survival: The Evolving Western Irrigation District, 1982 A~uz. ST. L.J. 377;
Burness, Cummings, Gorman, & Lansford, United States Reclamation Policy and Indian Water Rights,
20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 807 (1980); Roberts, Benefit-Cost A nalysi" Its Use (Misuse) in Evaluating Water
Resource Projects, 14 AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 81-83 (1976).
66. Roberts, supra note 65, at 74; Jaffe, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Multi-Objective Evaluation of
Federal Water Projects, 4 HARV. ENVT'L. L. REv. 58, 60, 61 (1980); R. BERKMAN & W. VISCUSI,
DAMMING THE WEST 55-62 (1973).
67. Comment, Desert Survival: The Evolving Western Irrigation District, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 377,

388-89.
68. See Weatherford, supra note 57, at 194-97.
69. WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9.

70. Id. at 31.
71. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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power."2 There is also a growing movement among fiscal conservatives and in Congress to charge prices for public power that are closer
to the market rate. Environmentalists join the cause of raising power
prices as a means of reducing demand for power and, hence, for new
power plants. As a result of all these pressures, power rates are virtually certain to increase. Perceiving the trend, some western states see
increased power revenues as a source of funds for further water project
development and a way to keep the benefits of existing water projects
in the region.
The Secretary of the Interior claims he has the discretion to manage the Colorado River dam system to maximize the production of
electricity, or to maximize the reliability of water supplies, or to satisfy
a range of statutory objectives as he sees fit. Indeed, the Colorado
River Basin Project Act empowers the Secretary to adopt criteria for
the operation of federal dams on the Colorado 3 and broad secretarial
discretion has been upheld by the courts.7 4 The Act does not, however, purport to supersede the compacts. Furthermore, the 1922
Compact expresses a clear preference for domestic and agricultural
uses over power production7 5 and that preference is reiterated in the
Basin Project Act. After listing several purposes, the Act mentions
"the generation and sale of electrical power as an incident of the foregoing purposes."7 6 Thus, there would appear to be some limitation on
the extent to which the Secretary could manage dams for power generation. Nevertheless, because electrical generation is far more important to the Basin states today than it was when most major projects on
the Colorado were authorized, there is less dispute over use for power
purposes than one might expect by simply looking at the law.
Limits on federal authority to operate Colorado River dams have
72. Roberts, Dam isKilling the Grand Canyon, 55, NATIONAL PARKS 18 (July/August 1981)
(expanded use of Glen Canyon Dam for peaking power could destroy the $12 million river-running
industry in the Grand Canyon as well as endangering fish and wildlife and damaging the physical
environment). See also the dispute over Marble and Bridge Canyon Dam which would have been
located near Grand Canyon, infra note 181 and accompanying text.
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (1982).
74. Yuma Mesa Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Udall, 253 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1966); Yuma
County Water Users Ass'n v. Udall, 231 F. Supp. 548 (D.D.C. 1964) (sustaining Secretary's power to
curtail impoundment of water in Glen Canyon Dam in order to provide water sufficient to satisfy power
generation contract obligations of Hoover Dam down-stream). See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 590 (1963) (affirming the extensive powers of the Secretary in managing the River).
75. Article IV(b) of the Compact states that:
[Wlater of the Colorado River System may be impounded and used for the generation of
electrical power, but such impounding and use shall be subservient to the use and consumption of such water for agricultural and domestic purposes and shall not interfere with or
prevent use for such dominant purposes.
76. 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982).
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not been determined. Congress presumably could appropriate the flow
of the Colorado for power generation to meet national energy needs.
A decision to manage the timing and amount of River flows solely to

generate power might be within the ambit of constitutional power over
navigable waters. If so, it would not be a taking of property subject to
compensation, 77 although it might contradict the Law of the River. If,
however, the Secretary exercises his broad power to enter into a contract to sell and deliver water 78 and then the water is used for power
generation, the deprived party could assert a breach of contract claim

against the United States under the waiver of sovereign immunity in
the Tucker Act.7 9

Competition between basins for the ability to use water for hydroelectric power may raise legal questions. Under the Compact the
Lower Basin may not demand delivery of water for power generation
unless it is also needed for agricultural and domestic uses. 80 But the
government may choose to generate power so long as it will not reduce

the amount of water available for Upper Basin agricultural and domestic uses. The Lower Basin should not be able to compel releases of
"excess" stored waters from the Upper Basin (i.e., over the Compact

entitlement) solely for power generation. 8 Invading storage to satisfy
Lower Basin power generation needs may diminish the Upper Basin's
ability to store water to meet future Compact water delivery obligations. Surely, releases of "excess" water that are made for power generation should be credited to the Upper Basin's Compact delivery
77. The power of Congress over navigable waters is not limited to what commonly is considered
control of navigation. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). Navigable waters are treated as
public property of the United States and thus the government need not pay compensation when it takes
the water power of a stream. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 73-74
(1913). But the rule in Gerlach, infra note 79, could make even a congressional breach of contract
compensable.
78. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617d, 617g(b) (1982); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See alsosupra
note 74.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Damages to water users should be compensable. In United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), the Supreme Court held that where a water right established under state law pursuant to the prior appropriation doctrine is destroyed by the federal government in the process of building a reclamation project, compensation will be allowed. The decision
reasoned that the legislative scheme for water development showed an intention that the navigation
servitude ordinarily would not be asserted to take irrigation waters without compensation.
80. Dean Meyers offers the following interpretation of the Compact:
. . . the Upper Basin must supply 75 million acre-feet to the Lower Basin in each progressive
ten-year period, although some of the water is used to generate power in the Lower Basin,
provided, however, that the Upper Basin may reduce deliveries below that figure to maintain
existing agricultural and domestic uses where the water withheld would be used by the Lower
Basin to generate electric power.
Meyers, supra note 2, at 21.
81. Clyde, Conflicts Between the Upper and Lower Basins on the ColoradoRiver in RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT: FRONTIERS FOR RESEARCH 113, 119-23 (1960).
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requirements during the ten-year window for calculating the
obligation.
Income from power generation is the primary source for repayment of costs of building and operating existing and planned federal
reservoir projects. This fact dampens potential legal and political objections to operations for power production. The Reclamation Act
originally required water users to repay all costs of dams.82 The Act,
however, was amended to remove the requirement,8 3 and now the Secretary contracts with irrigators for repayment after considering income from power revenues and the ability of the irrigator to pay. 4
The availability of power revenues is what makes most new water
projects economically feasible. Repayment is typically amortized over
fifty years at low interest rates-three percent in the case of Hoover
Dam. 5 Furthermore, the costs of project features attributable to irrigation are subject to no interest. 86 The Bureau of Reclamation generally credits payments first to the highest interest-bearing components
of a project before recouping costs of irrigation features.8 7 Once all
project costs are recovered, there are provisions for accumulation of
separate Upper and Lower Basin funds for further development of
each Basin.88 Projected income from power generation can justify
dams to provide Upper Basin storage that otherwise could not be
built.
Low-priced federal hydropower is an important benefit to the
West. Power prices may not exceed the cost of production plus the
cost of repaying capital obligations owed to the government for construction expenditures.89 Favorable interest rates and repayment
schedules keep those obligations low. The result is an inherent public
subsidy to power users. Power from Hoover Dam sells for 4.27 mills
per kilowatt hour (KWH).9 By contrast, privately sold energy costs
82. Comment, Reclamation Subsidies and Their Present-Day Impact, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 497,

508.
83. Id. at 519-20. The Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, 53 Stat. 1187 (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.) gave general authority for multipurpose reclamation projects and shifted
many project costs to other water users.
84. 43 U.S.C. §§ 485h(d) and (e) (1982).

85. 43 U.S.C. § 618e (1982).
86. Comment, Reclamation Subsidies and Their Present-Day Impact, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 497,
498-99, 518.
87. See U.S. Department of Energy Order No. RA 6120.2 (n.d.).
88. 43 U.S.C. §§ 618(a) and 620d(c) (1982).
89. Regulations for Generation and Sale of Power in Accordance with the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act, § 6, May 20, 1941, Secretary of the Interior, in Wilbur & Ely, supra note 5, at

A286.
90. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, chart entitled Determination of Energy
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upwards of ten times the Hoover Dam price. 91 The availability of
cheap power enables municipal water providers in southern California
to keep down the cost of pumping large amounts of River water across
the mountains to San Diego and the Los Angeles area. Consequently,
the Metropolitan Water District (MWD), which uses more of the
Lower Basin's share of water than any but the vast combined agricultural interests of the Imperial93 Valley, 92 is also one of the largest Hoover Dam power consumers.
In 1983, the Department of Energy proposed new criteria for
marketing Hoover Dam power after 1987 when present contracts will
expire. 94 Nevada and Arizona filed suit contesting the proposed criteria, essentially seeking larger allotments of Hoover's output. 95 In
1984, Congress passed legislation giving more power to Arizona and
Nevada, 96 and the states dropped their suits. The 1984 Hoover Dam
Act departed from the traditional cost-based pricing of federal power,
allowing rates to be increased by 4.5 mills/KWH for Arizona customers and 2.5 mills/KWH for California customers.9 7 The proceeds will
be used by Arizona to pay for features of the Central Arizona Project,
and by California to support salinity control measures. 98
Some Upper Basin interests have proposed that modest increases
in power rates be made to finance further water development.9 9 A new
revenue source is needed because the willingness of Congress to advance federal funds, to be repaid largely from power revenues, is waning. The 1984 Hoover Dam Act is precedent for "up front" use of
Rates, Effective June 1. 1982 (Hoover Dam); Telephone conversation with Robert W. Thompson, Engineer, Metropolitan Water District (May 10, 1983).
91. Southern California Edison Co. was paying 53 mills/KWH in 1983. So. Calif. Edison Co.
Standard Offer No. 4, Energy Only (1983).
92. Under an agreement of the Southern California water users the first priority to California's
entitlement from the river belongs to the major irrigation interests including the Imperial Irrigation
District, the Palo Verde Irrigation District and the Coachella Irrigation District. The three districts
may take up to 3.85 million acre-feet per year. Metropolitan Water District (MWD) has the next
priority, 550,000 acre-feet. Seven-party Water Agreement, August 18, 1931, Art. I, §§ 1-4, in Wilbur &
Ely, supra note 5, at A480. In fact, MWD has diverted much more than that amount for over 20 years,
utilizing a portion of Arizona's share that will not be usable in that state until the Central Arizona
Project is complete.
93. MWD is entitled to thirty-five percent of the first energy produced from Hoover Dam. In
addition, it has the first right to use any secondary energy produced from the dam. GeneralRegulations
for Generation and Sale of Power in Accordance with the Boulder Canyon ProjectAdjustment Act (May
20, 1941) in Wilbur & Ely, supra note 5, at A279-A286.
94. 48 Fed. Reg. 20872 (1983).
95. Nevada v. United States, No. 82-441 (D. Nev, filed Aug. 27, 1982).
96. Pub. L. No. 98-381, 98 Stat. 1333 (1984).
97. Id., 98 Stat. at 1333-34.
98. Id.; see also 43 U.S.C. §§ 1543(0 and (g).
99. Colorado's Proposal to Use CRSP Power Revenues for Water Project Financing (March 6,
1984); see infra text accompanying notes 175-177.
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power revenues for water projects. Legislation applying power revenues directly to water projects could also serve to preempt a growing
movement to increase power revenues and divert them to federal purposes outside the area where the revenues are produced. An amendment to the Hoover Bill that would have increased power rates to
market levels was only narrowly defeated."o Critics of low-priced federal power are not only moved by a desire to recover greater income
for the federal treasury; they also argue that increased power rates
would discourage excessive power and water use. 101 The drive to raise
federal revenue by increasing power rates should be tempered by recognition of the historical fact that Congress intended the hydroelectric
systems to provide benefits to the regions served, not as proprietary
endeavors to extract revenues from those regions.
The Basin states should be able to resolve the tension between the
needs of their citizens for reasonably priced power and the temptation
to maximize power generation revenues to finance and repay water
projects needed in the region. If power prices charged in the region
are raised with no direct benefit to the region, the Basin states will be
bitterly opposed. At that point, technical arguments about the extent
to which the United States can use Colorado River dams for power
production versus other uses may be raised. Unless and until power
pricing incites the Basin states to action, their efforts will probably be
spent in cooperative negotiation with the Secretary of the Interior over
details of the operating criteria. It is in the interest of all to help
achieve the optimal balance between production of low-cost power for
use in the region and other uses that may come into conflict with
power production.
C. Indian Reserved Rights
In Arizona v. California,1 2 the United States Supreme Court allocated about 900,000 acre-feet of the Colorado River annually to the
100. 130 CONG. REC. H3319-3333, (Daily Ed.) May 3, 1984; House Votes to Retain Cheap Sale
of Hoover Dam Power in 3 States, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1984, at 1.
101. Editorial, Power to Some of the People, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1984; Why Hoover Dam's 'DirtCheap'PowerMay Stay in the Hands of a Few, Bus. WK., Apr. 16, 1984, at 124; Graff and Marcus, The
Revenue Runoff From Hoover Dam, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1984, at 28. The President's Fiscal Year 1986
budget proposes to change the method of repayment of existing obligations for federal hydropower
projects, so that current interest rates would apply and principal would be recovered on not less than a
straight line amortization. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR
1986, Appendix IJ19 through I-J31 (1985). This would have a substantial effect on power rates and
revenues. It would raise Colorado River Storage Project (Upper Basin) power rates by 8.10 mills/
KWH, nearly doubling current rates. WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL POWER
MARKETING REFORM (Feb. 1985).
102. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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five Indian tribes located along the mainstem,10 3 and 79,000 acre-feet
per year for use on federal lands in the vicinity."o The allocation was
not based on prior use, but upon the doctrine of reserved rights. The
doctrine teaches that when federal or Indian lands are reserved, rights
to water sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reservation are also
reserved. 0 5 Under the doctrine, later Indian uses can displace non-

Indians who commenced their uses after the land reservations were
established. 106
The Court said the purpose of the five Colorado River Indian
reservations was to sustain agriculture and, accordingly, it fixed the
tribes' entitlement at an amount sufficient to irrigate all "practicably
irrigable acreage" on the reservations.' 0 7 This standard enabled quantification of reserved rights, and facilitated planning by the tribes and
other River water users.'° 8 Yet some uncertainties remained and the

Court retained continuing jurisdiction. 101
In 1979, the tribes, which had been represented in the earlier suit
by the United States, intervened on their own behalf and sought to

reopen the case to rectify what they perceived to be errors in calculating practicably irrigable acreage and to consider changed circum103. Id. at 600. The tribes whose claims were decided were the Chemehuevi Tribe, Cocopah
Tribe, Colorado River Tribe, Fort Mojave Tribe, and Quechan Tribe. Id. at 595 n.97.
104. Id. at 601. The Court allocated to the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge a right to
divert 41,839 acre-feet per year or to consume 37,339 acre-feet; to the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge a right to divert 28,000 acre-feet per year or to consume 3,000; and the Lake Mead National
Recreation Area was decreed sufficient quantities of water to satisfy its purposes.
105. In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the United States Supreme Court upheld
the right of Indians on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana to take water needed by and
already being used by non-Indian settlers. The non-Indians relied on Montana law which accorded
water rights to the first to appropriate it. The Supreme Court upheld the Indians' later assertion of
water rights dating back to the establishment of the reservation. Although the agreement setting aside
the reservation was silent on water rights, the Court read the cession of large land areas in return for
the smaller reservation bounded by a river to imply a reservation of sufficient water to make the reserved lands useful. Because the purpose of the reservation was "to train, encourage and accustom [the
Indians] to habits of industry and to promote their civilization and improvement," their efforts at irrigation were to be protected. 207 U.S. at 566-67. See generally Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and
How It Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 639.
106. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576
(1908); Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
107. 373 U.S. at 600-01. The Court approved the report of the Special Master who had found:
"The reservations of water were made for the purpose of enabling the Indians to develop a viable
agricultural economy ..." S. RIFKIND, REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER, ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA, 373

U.S. 546 (1963).
108. The Public Land Law Review Commission concluded that "the uncertainty generated by the
[reserved rights] doctrine is an impediment to sound coordinated planning for future water resources
development." PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 144

(1970).
109. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 345 (1964).
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stances. They requested an expanded allocation of water rights." 0 A
Court-appointed special master recommended that the Indians' annual
entitlement be increased by about 317,000 acre-feet because the United
States had not claimed all of the tribes' irrigable acreage."1 ' The
Master applied standards of economic feasibility to determine what
land was "practicably irrigable.""' 2 He rejected state claims that the
benefit from Indian water use must exceed the cost of water by a particular margin to be feasible, and claims that "practicability" should
be determined by nineteenth century
standards rather than by stan3
dards of current technology."1
On review of the special master's report, the Supreme Court refused to allow the tribes to expand their entitlement based on the government's failure in the earlier litigation to claim certain lands as
"practicably irrigable." The Court stated there is a "strong interest in
finality" where "certainty . . . with respect to water rights in the
Western United States" is at stake. 4 This indicates that once Indian
reserved water rights have been quantified, affected water users can
rely on the quantification, without fear that it will be changed in the
future.
1. Magnitude of Indian Rights
The Indians' rights have not been fully utilized. One tribe, Fort
Mojave, has diverted an average of seventy-seven percent of its entitlement. Another, Chemehuevi, has diverted none." 5 This is partly due
to a lack of diversion and distribution facilities. Federal assistance in
developing the means to irrigate Indian land has been lacking, even as
the government has provided copious aid to the tribes' competitors for
water from the same sources." 6
110. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).

111.

S. TUTTLE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, ARIZONA V. CALIFORNIA 281-83 (1982).

112. Id. at 96. The standards were more rigorous than those applied in evaluating Bureau of
Reclamation projects. See Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, United States Reclamation Policy
and Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 807 (1980).
113. S. TUTTLE, supra note 11,at 93-100.
114. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983). The Court did allow for enlarged entitlements if and when boundary disputes left open in the 1964 decree are judicially decided, effectively
continuing uncertainty as to water rights on several thousand acres. 460 U.S. at 629-36. See S. TuTTLE, supra note 111, at 106-11 for a summary of the claims to additional irrigable acreage.
115. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983).
116. With the encouragement, or at least the cooperation, of the Secretary of Interior-the
very office entrusted with protection of all Indian rights--many large irrigation projects were
constructed on streams that flowed through or bordered Indian Reservations, sometimes
above and more often below the Reservations. With few exceptions the projects were planned
and built by the Federal Government without any attempt to define, let alone protect, prior
rights that Indian tribes might have had in the waters used for the projects. . . . In the
history of the United States Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to protect
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As Indian use expands, it could cut into the ability of the states to
develop Colorado River water. Although many of the lands considered "practicably irrigable" in Arizona v. Californiado not justify substantial investment, 17 tribes have begun to develop more productive
uses including leases of water for nonagricultural enterprises.' 1
While the quantity of water allocated to the tribes is measured by potential agricultural uses, the tribes are not limited to making agricultural applications." 9
Tribes other than the five that were represented in Arizona v. California may claim extensive reserved rights to Colorado River Basin
waters. Reserved rights of the huge Navajo Reservation and others
such as the Ute, Gila River, and Papago could significantly impact the
economies of the states where they are located. One estimate of what
a court would award the Navajos based on an irrigable acreage
formula is 2,000,000 acre-feet per year while Arizona's entire compact
share is only 2,800,000 acre-feet.' 20 If the "practicably irrigable acreage" standard that evolved in Arizona v. Californiais strictly applied,
however, Navajo rights probably would be more limited, though still
large. The high cost of delivering water to lands at elevations and
distances far from the water's source and the marginal quality of soils
severely reduce economic feasibility, and hence "practicability," of irrigation. Yet, as Arizona approaches the limits of its allocation, and
California has already consumed its allocation, any significant reduction in water available to them could be devastating.
2. Quantifying Reserved Rights
The essential problem with reserved rights is not their existence,
but their uncertain quantity, leading some to call for congressional
quantification. 12' Commentators have warned that congressional
Indian water rights for use on the Reservations it set aside for them is one of the sorrier
chapters.
NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE - FINAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 474-75 (1973).

117. S. TUTTLE, supra note 111, at 192 et seq.
118. Eg., Memorandum of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior, Feb. 1, 1964 (approving of use of water by lessee of Colorado River Indian Tribe for recreational and housing development).
119. See Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979) (Indian water rights that were quantified
based on irrigable acreage need not be confined to agricultural uses); S. RIFKIND supra note 107, at 26566. See also infra notes 129, 130, and accompanying text.

120. Back & Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the Colorado Rivers, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 71, 74 and 74 n.12 (1980). Indian water rights are charged against the allocations made
to the states where the reservations are located. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546; United States v.
California, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
121. See Clyde, Special Considerations Involving Indian Rights, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 237
(1975). Note, A Proposalfor the Quantificationof Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
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quantification is doomed to failure unless the interests of all parties are
represented, a difficult objective when politically powerful interests are
pitted against Indian tribes.' 2 2 In view of the wide differences among
tribes in the cultural and economic importance of water, varied climates and competing non-Indian demands, a generic solution to all
tribes' reserved water rights claims seems inappropriate.
Litigation of reserved rights claims case by case is an expensive
and time-consuming process. Wyoming has spent $7.2 million to liti123
gate federal and Indian claims, yet many questions still persist.

Dozens of Indian reserved rights cases are currently before the
courts

24

with little prospect of early or complete resolution.

A promising way of resolving the haunting uncertainties of Indian reserved rights is through agreements between tribes and other
users. As the following examples demonstrate, attempts to negotiate
Indian water claims in the Basin states have produced mixed results.
The Bureau of Reclamation and the Central Utah Water Conservancy District sought the agreement of the Utes of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation that they would defer development of some 15,000
acres of land to ensure that there would be enough water to justify
building the Central Utah Project (CUP). The tribe received vague
promises that substitute water would be developed for its benefit
before 2005 when a final unit of the CUP was planned to be completed.' 25 The Indians later challenged the agreement as unlawful,
charging that there was little or no consideration in exchange for the
tribe's promise to forego using water. Further, the agreement was
never authorized by Congress, as required by law.' 26 In 1980, a com1299, 1301 (1974). See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL
AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RESOLUTION 58 (1978). The
Western Regional Council representing resource development and financial interests put forward one
proposal following a comprehensive study of Indian needs. Another was suggested by the Western
Conference of the Council of State Governments that would have extinguished all Indian rights not
actually used or deemed by the Secretary of Interior to be exercisable prior to or within an eight-year
period following the bill's enactment. J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WHAT INDIAN WATER MEANS TO THE
WEST 15-17, 139-43 (1982). A similar bill failed in the Ninety-eighth Congress. H.R. 3995, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess.
122. See DuMars & Ingram, Congressional Quantification of Indian Reserved Water Rights: A
Definitive Solution or a Mirage? 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 17 (1980).

123.

WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 98

(1984).

124. Id. at 100-11.
125. Ute Indian Deferral Agreement of September 20, 1965 (Bureau of Reclamation Contract
No. 14-06-W-194); see Clyde, supra note 121. The deferral agreement is also discussed in J. FOLKWILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 88-90.
126. Interests in Indian real property cannot be transferred without congressional consent. F.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 510-22 (1982). A contract to defer use of water rights
effectively "leases" rights to others and should come within the restriction on alienation. See New
Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); United
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pact was negotiated between the Utes and the state of Utah to validate

the deferral agreement and quantify the tribe's reserved water rights.
The agreement requires the state to give additional security for furnishing substitute water and the tribe to yield some jurisdiction over
water rights. The state has ratified the Compact but the tribe has
not. 127

In 1968, the Navajos consented to limiting the use of water on
more than one-half of the Upper Basin portion of their huge reservation to facilitate construction of a coal-burning power plant at Page,
Arizona.128 Induced by promises of jobs for Navajos and increased
tribal revenues, the Navajos agreed to confine their claims to the
amount of Arizona's Upper Basin share of water under the Upper Basin Compact-50,000 acre-feet a year-for the life of the plant or for
fifty years, whichever was earlier. They also consented to the use of
34,100 acre-feet of that water by the power plant. 129
By another agreement made in 1957, the Navajos waived their
1868 priority date on the San Juan River in exchange for congressional
approval of the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project which was in conflict
with the San Juan-Chama Project sought by non-Indian interests.
Both projects would draw on the San Juan River. Congress insisted
that the conflicts between Indian rights and non-Indian uses be resolved before it approved the projects, so the tribe agreed to share
shortages with non-Indian beneficiaries.' 3 0
The wisdom of both Navajo agreements has been cast into
doubt.13' Neither the number of jobs nor the revenues from the Page
power plant approached the expectations voiced in negotiations. Dissatisfaction with the arrangement has increased and the validity of the
tribe's approval has been challenged.' 32 In the 1957 deal, it has been
suggested that the tribe compromised valuable water rights in exStates v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
Indian water rights may be leased in conjunction with leases of Indian land, but "no general federal
statutes ... authorize the sale or lease of Indian water rights separate and apart from the land." F.
COHEN, supra, at 593. To the extent that the agreement purports to grant jurisdiction to the state it
also requires congressional consent. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
127. The proposed compact is discussed and reprinted in J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at
90-91, 132-38. The compact does not call for consent of Congress, which would be required before it
could be enforced against the tribe.
128. The tribe's agreement was required by the Act authorizing use of federal funds for construction. See Act of Sept. 30, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, title III, § 303, 82 Stat. 889, as amended, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1523 (1982).
129. See Price & Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice:Navajo Experience in
the Colorado River Basin, LAW & CONTEMP. Ptoas. 97, 109,14 (1976).
130. Id. at 119-25.
131. Id. at 114-19; 125-30.
132. Back & Taylor, supra note 120, at 71, 87-88.
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change for an irrigation project plagued with economic problems and
mismanagement. 33 The Navajo Indian Irrigation Project changed in
character from a project to benefit family farms to one best suited for
larger farms which the Navajos were not equipped to develop or operate, and its construction was delayed for many years.
Congress has approved two settlements of recent Arizona water
disputes. The Ak-Chin Indian Community agreed to forego substantial water claims it had raised against non-Indians in return for a
promise of 85,000 acre-feet of irrigation water to be furnished by the
Secretary of the Interior from a federal project. 13 4 The Papago Indian
Tribe compromised its claims against groundwater users in the Tucson
area. "3' 5 The first Act approving the Papago settlement was vetoed by
the President because the federal government had not been significantly involved in the negotiating process. In the view of the President the government was being called upon to fund "a multi-million
dollar bailout . . . of the mining companies and local water users"
who would be relieved of the Indian claims. 13 6 A second Act was approved.' 3 7 Like the Ak-Chin settlement, the Papago negotiations were
ultimately successful. In both, the tribes received fair consideration
for their rights, including credible promises of delivered water. The
two Navajo examples and the Ute example encountered more difficulties because the tribes' interests were not adeqiately secured, leading
to results that could be questioned.
3. Non-Indian Use of Indian Water Rights
Agreements with the Colorado River tribes could help solve
southern California's expected shortfall in available water supplies.
Leases and other transfers of Indian water rights could be made for an
appropriate sum, or for other consideration, such as a trade for irrigable land elsewhere, construction of irrigation facilities to serve part of
the reservation, a share of electric power produced, or an interest in a
business.
A basic question is whether Indian reserved rights should be
alienable.' 38 Reserved water rights were created to fulfill the purposes
of Indian reservations. The overall purpose of every Indian reservation is to provide a permanent homeland where the tribe can be eco133. DuMars & Ingram, supra note 122.
134. Act of July 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409.
135. Act of Oct. 12, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1261.
136. R. REAGAN, WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 732-33 (1982).
137. Act of Oct. 12, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1261.
138. See Palma, Considerations and Conclusions Concerningthe Transferability of Indian Water
Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 90 (1980).
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nomically self-sufficient and govern itself. 139 Thus, reservation
purposes conceivably could be fulfilled by selling or leasing water to

others for use off the reservation." 4 But Indian reservation purposes
arguably do not include off-reservation use of water unrelated to reser-

vation resources. 141 The National Water Commission has recommended the enactment of general legislation enabling leasing of Indian
water rights as a way of dealing with the uncertainties that beset both

Indians who want to preserve their rights for the future and non-Indi142
ans who want to secure a dependable water supply.
Policy considerations must be weighed in authorizing the transfer
of Indian water rights. Tribes may be better off receiving payments
instead of water, and others may be quite willing to pay for the assur-

ance of a supply not subject to interruption by the exercise of reserved
rights. But even if other users of the River have formally acknowledged Indian rights, will the water ever be available to the tribes for
their own uses should they need it? And what are the tradeoffs in
terms of coherent social structure and community life? A community
could be built on a developed agricultural use of water but probably
could not be founded on a common interest in collection and distribution of periodic payments to forego such uses. As in other Indian policy debates, the ultimate question is to what extent should Indians be
assimilated into the larger society? Because Congress must consider
and approve alienation of Indian water rights, the issues surely will be
aired in any transaction.
While Indians and the federal government may want to consider
carefully the policy implications of schemes for marketing Indian
water, the idea holds great promise for non-Indian water users whose
rights are now plagued with uncertainty. Quantification of reserved
rights alone does not solve the problem of non-Indians who need the
water that is subject to those rights. They need assurance that the
water will be available. The assurance can come from a contract ratified by Congress. Some non-Indian water users may resist paying for
139. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post Co.
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686 (1965); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 11718 (1938); United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 537 (1938); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1918). The Court in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 n.4
(1978), acknowledged that Indian reserved water rights are implied from these broad purposes. Winters
spoke of encouraging "habits of industry" and "advancing the civilization and improvement of the
Indians." 207 U.S. at 567.
140. See DuMars & Ingram, supra note 122, at 31.
141. F. COHEN, supra note 125, at 589 n.85. But see Palma, supra note 138, at 91.
142. U.S. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTURE-FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

480-81 (1973). Congress

has authorized leases of Indian lands. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1983). Lessees can make use of Indian water
rights. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921).
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water that now is available for free. But guaranteed availability has
great value where there is a threat of losing supplies to Indian water
development. Of course, non-Indians would not agree to purchase Indian water unless it was already being used by the Indians or there was
a reasonable prospect of its development. Only competition for use of
the water (by Indians and non-Indians), not simply the existence of
rights, will give economic value to Indian reserved rights. Allowing
the market to operate in the realm of Indian reserved rights, then,
would be salutary.
D. Fish, Wildlife, and Recreation
The waters of the Colorado are as intensely and thoroughly used
and reused as those of any river in the world. For a century, many
have devoted their lives and talents to harnessing the wild Colorado
River to provide the raw materials of a burgeoning civilization. Bustling economies have been built, mostly outside the watershed of the
River. Ironically, those who first surveyed the Colorado Basin found
it to be "valueless," exclaiming that they "cannot conceive of a more
worthless and impracticable region than the area we now find ourselves in." Other early visitors said "ours has been the first, and undoubtedly will be the last, party of whites to visit the locality. It seems
intended by nature that the Colorado River, along the greater portion
of its lonely and majestic way, shall be forever unvisited and
undisturbed." 14' 3
While most of the benefits of the Colorado River have been
reaped far from its banks, its enchantment as a natural phenomenon
has drawn millions to it. Even as it has been changed by man's hand,
144
people have realized that the River is valuable in its natural state.
The River has carved spectacular canyons that expose visitors to a
cross-section of geology telling the story of the earth's formation.
Peaceful beaches and crashing rapids enthrall boaters, hikers, and
campers. Views are incomparable. The unreal colors of the Grand
Canyon are famous throughout the world.
The complex of dams and reservoirs are properly blamed for obstructing use of the River for rafting and kayaking, blocking passage
by native fish, changing the River's regime, causing erosion of beaches,
creating irregular flows, altering water temperatures needed for fish,
and changing indigenous vegetation. Yet River development has also
brought new forms of recreation and opened the River to millions of
143. P. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE 181-82 (1981).
144. See Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 317 (1985) (discussing the growing consensus that leaving water in a stream may be a valid use).
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visitors. Gigantic lakes-Lake Mead behind Hoover Dam, Lake Powell behind Glen Canyon Dam, and many others-offer fiat water recreation to millions each year. Houseboaters, water skiers, jet boaters,
fishermen, recreational vehicle campers, four-wheelers, swimmers, and
tourists in waterfront resorts and casinos flock to the Colorado River.
Today, campgrounds along the Colorado are jammed, and there are
waiting lists for expensive river trips. River-running permits are
sought years in advance, and air pollution from the endless stream of
automobiles threatens the Grand Canyon.
Tourism and recreation have contributed handsomely to the
economies of the Basin states; probably the single greatest economic
contribution the River makes to the communities within the Basin. Of
course, the River has the greatest economic importance to the portions
of the Basin states outside the Basin itself. Like a microcosm of the
West within the United States, the River is exploited largely for the
benefit of those elsewhere. At least the tourist economy leaves much
of the wealth that is produced in local areas.
The tremendous economic importance of recreation and tourism
has contributed to an awareness that enjoyment of the River in its
natural environment is not simply an amenity by-product. The difficulty lies in attaching a price tag to uses of water in the stream. A
willingness to pay for aesthetics is shown when people pay for dams,
canals, pipelines, pumps, and electricity to bring water a thousand
miles to make a golf course green, to water flowers, or to fill a fountain. But what is a river worth in its natural state? The multi-million
dollar contribution of the river-running industry in the Colorado
River Basin is one indicator. In addition, tourists (river runners and
others) contribute much more for travel, meals, lodging, equipment,
and incidentals. Independent of recreation use values, a recent Colorado study concluded that the public is willing to pay substantial
amounts of money for preservation of many rivers in their wild condition. 4 ' They would pay for the assurance that rivers would remain
available for possible future use and for the knowledge that they are
being preserved.
Congress passed the federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to preserve in a free-flowing condition rivers that have outstanding "scenic,
recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, and other
similar values." 14' 6 Portions of seven tributaries and a portion of the
mainstem of the Colorado have been studied for designation as wild
145. R. WALSH, L. SANDERS & J. LOOMIS, WILD AND SCENIC RIVER ECONOMICS: RECREATION USE AND PRESENTATION VALUES 71-73

(1985).

146. Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982).
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and scenic rivers.14 7 Remarkably, none yet has been protected. The
Act prevents development that would interfere with a river's flows.
The possibility of future development of the River may therefore have
stalled designation. Until the relative importance of recreation and
natural preservation can be balanced against the value of water development, there is an understandable reluctance to preclude
development.
Hundreds of species of fish and wild animals inhabit the ecosystems that are supported by the Colorado. Development and the presence of humans have reduced populations of some species. The
greatest changes have been to native fish species. Dams have altered
the River's ecology. Flow regimes are different; some canyons are now
filled with deep, still water rather than rapids. Consequently, sediment settles out of the water and temperatures are varied. The unique
conditions of the River that allowed indigenous fish species to evolve
have changed. Now some of those species are threatened with extinction. At the same time many exotic fish species such as rainbow,
brown and brook trout, perch, sunfish, and carp have been introduced,
creating new and popular sport fisheries in the waters released from,
and stored in, large reservoirs. But the introduction of some such nonnative fish has caused competition with native species, further reducing their numbers.14
Today the effects of water project development on fish and wildlife are usually considered before a project proceeds. The Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act149 demands that the effects of federal water
projects on fish habitats be considered before construction begins. 5 °
This can lead to conditions requiring mitigation or prevention of harm
to fish and wildlife. The federal Endangered Species Act,' 5 1 the nation's most rigorous and demanding environmental law, provides
nearly absolute protection for animal and plant species which are designated "endangered" or "threatened" by the Secretary of the

Interior. 152
A few of the indigenous fish species of the Upper Colorado River,
147.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1276(a)(34), (36), (38), (39), (43), (47), (55), and (56) (1982).

148.

R. BEHNKE

& D.

BENSON, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES OF THE UPPER COLO-

RADO RIVER BASIN 7-8 (1980).
149. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666c (1982).
150. Federal agencies must consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service and take mitigation measures to alleviate any adverse effects of water resources projects. Eg., Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375
(W.D. Tenn. 1972). The Corps of Engineers must consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service even
before issuing a dredge and fill permit to a private party. United States v. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d 597
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1974).
151. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
152. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1982).
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including the squawfish, the humpback chub, and the bonytail chub,
are listed as endangered.15 3 The Endangered Species Act requires the
federal proponent of any project that might affect the habitat of an
endangered species, as well as federal agencies acting on permits
needed by a private project, to consult with the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary is responsible for ensuring that the action will not
"jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species and
threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of
1 54
habitat of such species."'
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service in 1983 issued a draft
recovery plan that would require any water project proponent in the
Upper Colorado River to ensure substantial minimum streamflows. 155
Many criticized the plan because it portended dramatic effects on future water use in the Colorado, alleging that it was not soundly based
on, or compelled by, scientific data. The agency finally agreed to convene a coordinating committee to consider the views of all interested
parties, including the Upper Basin states, water developers, and envi156
ronmentalists, and to reconsider the draft plan.
Congress created the Endangered Species Act to curtail an accelerating extinction of species by human activities. Sensitive species
may serve the same function as the canary historically carried into
coal mines to detect deadly gas-a bellwether that human existence
may be less secure as a result of human effects on the environment.
Conceivably, the fate of the squawfish and the humpback chub in the
Colorado River is a bellwether; but it is more likely that the issue of
how to protect endangered species on the Colorado River turns instead on how to administer an important federal statute in the face of
inadequate data. The Act could be invoked to block water development as it was when the snail darter was discovered at the site of Tennessee's Tellico Dam. 157 But its noble purposes notwithstanding, the
Act is a crude device for determining how much development is
enough and how much of a river should be preserved. The endan153. R. BEHNKE & D. BENSON, supra note 148, at 9.
154. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982).
155.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, (DRAFT) RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED FISHES OF

THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1983).

156. Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, State of Colorado, State of Utah, and State of Wyoming, August 1984.
157. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). See also Riverside Irrigation Dist.
v. Andrews, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1985) (Corps of Engineers can consider indirect downstream effects
on habitat from changes in water quantity as well as changes in water quality in issuing dredge and fill
permits under § 404 of the Clean Water Act). The federal government must strive to accommodate its
requirements to the state's interest in allocating water. Id.; National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,
693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Ci. 1982); Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights,
20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1985).
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gered fish of the Colorado may be perpetuated through a program of
public and private measures. The possibilities include water releases
from federal dams, purchases and appropriations of instream flows, a
hatchery and propagation program, and fish passage facilities at dams.
Such a program could make water development and some new dams
compatible with survival of fish. But the question of what further development is appropriate must be answered by considering issues
much broader than the effects of development on endangered fish.
Determining what balance to strike among important values arising from the presence or use of the River belongs in the first instance
to the individual states. 158 Most states consider a number of public
interest factors before permitting water to be used.' 5 9 These factors
aregenerally extensive enough to allow recreation, aesthetics, economics,,and fish and wildlife values to be weijghed. The relative weights
attributed to each concern may turn on political judgments. Some
states, however, narrowly circumscribe considerations for granting a
permit to appropriate water and in Colorado there are no requirements beyond a judicial. finding that rights of prior appropriators are
prdtected 160 If rights can be freely traded, the marketplace provides a
test.of whether society's economic interests%
are served. But the interests of future generations and of broad segments of the public are
rarely fully represented in water rights transactions. Thus, the Basin
states should make. a deliberate effort to confront the consequences of
water development and preservation decisions in a comprehensive,
open planning process.
III.

MAXIMIZING THE

RIVER'S

POTENTIAL

A. Siorage
The traditional response to problems on the Colorado-and to
water supply issues generally-has been to construct water storage facilities. That response becomes less apt in much of the Colorado River
Basin as storage opportunities reach their practical and economic limits. Future responses necessarily will emphasize administration and
management over physical solutions. Large, federally-funded water
projects have been and are essential elements in the River's history and
in the economies of Basin states. But the government is unlikely to
support much new project construction. For the Upper Basin this
change seems inequitable because the' faster developing Lower Basin
has.garnered the bulk of federal Water project subsidies.
.158.

California v. United States, 43"8 U.S. 645 (1978).

159. See authorities summarized inD. GETCHs, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 147-52 (1984).

160. Id. at 156-59.
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Hoover Dam became the foundation for tremendous economic
growth in California by regulating destructive floods, storing irrigation
water for fertile desert lands, and supporting the expanding population
centers of southern California with water and cheap electric power. A
number of smaller dams, most importantly Parker and Davis, were
added on the lower mainstem to store and regulate water supplies and
generate power. Two large reservoirs in the Upper Basin-Flaming
Gorge and Glen Canyon (Lake Powell)-together hold 30,800,000
acre-feet, 16 1 to protect future Compact deliveries to the Lower Basin.
However, in over thirty years since Flaming Gorge was built, and almost as long since Glen Canyon was completed, the only benefits produced have been electric power generation and some flood control.
The dams are primarily an insurance policy against future water
shortages.
The Lower Basin states are at or near the limits of their Compact
entitlements. California has been using in excess of its 4,400,000 acrefeet; Arizona has been impeded in taking its 2,800,000 acre-feet,16 2
though not by lack of demand. The completion of Arizona's gargantuan delivery system, the Central Arizona Project (CAP), will soon
expose the River to the thirst of the growing Phoenix and Tucson areas-a thirst greater than the state's entire Compact apportionment.
As anticipated by the Compact negotiators, the Upper Basin
states have developed much more slowly and their demand for-water
has not yet approached the copious available supplies. New Mexico
alone among the Upper Basin states is in a position to use its entitlement. Utah is building the Central Utah Project (CUP) which, like
the CAP, features an aqueduct system to serve areas distant from the
River. 163
Colorado and Wyoming have made the least progress in securing
the means to put their Compact waters to use. Eventually it is expected that each state will consume its full share of water. In anticipation of these future needs, Colorado's influential twelve-term
congressman, the late Wayne Aspinall, exacted a promise from Congress to build five projects as the price of his support for building the
CAP. The 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act authorizing the
CAP stated:
the Secretary is directed to proceed as nearly as practicable
161.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 27TH ANNUAL REPORT, COLORADO RIVER STOR-

AGE PROJECT AND PARTICIPATING PROJECTS, FISCAL YEAR 1983 at 11 (1984).
162.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM CONSUMPTIVE

USES

AND LOSSES REPORT 1976-80 at 34.
163.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE REVIEW,

CENTRAL UTAH PROJECT (Dec. 1984).

BONNEVILLE UNIT,

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

with the construction of the [five Colorado] participating Federal reclamation projects concurrently with the construction of
the Central Arizona Project to the end that such projects shall
be completed not later than the date of the first delivery of
water from said Central Arizona Project. 1"
The CAP is nearing completion, but after seventeen years only
two of the five Colorado projects are under construction (Dolores and
Dallas Creek), two appear to be dead (San Miguel and West Divide),
and one has only a remote hope of being constructed (Animas-La
Plata). The only viable means for enforcing the commitment is political, yet that avenue has been unsuccessful notwithstanding many
years of effort. Judicial enforcement of the commitment, ordering
Congress to appropriate funds for an authorized project, would con65
front separation of powers problems under the Constitution.,
1. Decline in Federal Funding
Prospects are dim for federal funding of major new water projects
in the Basin, whether they have been authorized by Congress or not.
The federal government has been generous in its largess for water
projects for over seventy years and the Colorado River Basin has been
the centerpiece of the Reclamation program. 66 There once was a consensus that Colorado River water development was a national need to
be satisfied by national expenditures repayable with project revenues.
Now, a strong bipartisan sentiment, based largely on fiscal conservatism coupled with a genuine need to curb government spending, favors
curtailing further federal investments in water projects. No new construction on federal water projects has begun in almost ten years.
The federally authorized projects that remain to be built-mainly
Upper Basin storage facilities-are difficult to justify economically and
would not directly benefit large numbers of people. For instance, Colorado's congressionally-authorized but never-funded Fruitland Mesa
Project would benefit only sixty-nine ranchers at a cost of $82.8 million. Another authorized but unfunded project, Savery-Pot Hook in
164. 43 U.S.C. § 620 a-I (1982).
165. Under the spending clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7,
only Congress can appropriate money. Congress has specified that the enactment of an appropriation
act is required before any money can be spent. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (1982). This is so notwithstanding
the fact that an expenditure has been authorized, as Congress need not fund the authorization. See
State of Connecticut v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 979, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1207
(1983); Haskins Bros. & Co. v. Morgenthau, 85 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 588 (1936).
166. Federal expenditures for construction of water projects in the Colorado River Basin for the
period 1903-1980 exceeded 3.66 billion dollars-more than one-half the national total. The full Reclamation budget for the Basin during the same period was 4.92 billion dollars. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT (Government Printing Office, 1981), appendix 2.
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Colorado and Wyoming, would irrigate only 14,650 acres, but would
curtail grazing on 21,750 acres and would cost an average of $700,000
for each ranch served. 167 Some federally authorized projects have
more favorable economics. The Animas-La Plata Project shows a
1.6:1 benefit-cost ratio,1 68 but has failed to attract enough political
support because of its great cost.
In 1977, President Carter deleted eight major water projects from
the federal budget for fiscal 1978. All previously authorized projects
and all new projects were to be reviewed by the Water Resources
Council after a study that considered environmental factors and nonstructural alternatives pursuant to principles and standards that had
been in effect for several years. 169 President Carter aroused western
ire when he announced that approval was to be contingent upon a
number of things, including a showing that the benefit-cost ratio of a
project was greater than one to one.17 0 The Reagan Administration
adopted an ostensibly more flexible set of "Principles and Guidelines"
for evaluation of projects that allows consideration of a variety of national and regional benefits from economic development. t 7' The new
approach, however, has not enabled construction of any new projects
or funding of long-authorized water development.
Reagan Administration policy requires that the states bear a portion of the initial costs of any water project to be funded by the United
States. 72 This not only reduces the federal obligation, but is a measure of a project's importance to the state. The objection of some congressional leaders to the concept, however, has blocked proposals that
t7
included provisions for cost-sharing.
The near demise of federal funding, and rigid conditions of feasibility and state cost-sharing shift the onus of water project financing to
state and private sources. A state may decide to finance a project with
little immediate utility in order to protect future access to supplies or
167. P. FRADKIN, supra note 143, 11-12.

168. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WESTERN COLORADO PROJECTS REVIEW 83 (1983). The
benefit-cost ratio was calculated by discounting annual benefits over a one-hundred year period at a rate
of 3.25 percent and amortizing project costs over 100 years at 3.25 percent simple interest. U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, Animas-La PlataProject, Colorado-New Mexico, Definite Plan Report 140, 144 (1979).
169. Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related Land Resources, 38 Fed. Reg. 24,
778 (1973) (formerly codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 711, 713, 714 and 716).
170. R. LAMM & M. MCCARTHY, THE ANGRY WEST 186 (1982).
171. Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies, 48 Fed. Reg. 10, 259 (1983). The Missouri Department of Conservation and an environmental group has challenged the legality of replacing the principles and standards
with the new principles and standards. National Wildlife Federation v. Clark, No. 84-2272 (D.D.C.
filed July 24, 1984).
172. See Letter from Ronald Reagan to Paul Laxalt (Jan. 24, 1984).
173. Interstate Conference on Water Problems, 3 WASHINGTON REPORT 2-5 (Nov. 1984).
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to support an important industry, like agriculture, that has difficulty
paying its own way. But staggering costs are likely to thwart most
projects. State finances in the Upper Basin have suffered considerably
in recent years. 174 Tax bases are growing but state legislatures are
under pressure to keep taxes down, to assume functions now being
abdicated to state and local governments by the federal government,
and to meet growing infrastructure needs. This will compel scrutiny of
the economics of any water project proposed for state funding. State
financial assistance is likely to depend on a comparison of the expected
benefits from several competing projects and a showing that the project is not one that private enterprise or local governments could finance and build. States also must weigh competing needs for
rehabilitation and repairs of existing facilities. A dam that is in poor
repair and must be operated at less than its full capacity for safety
reasons can impair existing water uses. Repairs have immediate effects and may be more cost effective than building new storage
facilities.
An innovative approach to publicly-supported water project finance has been proposed by Colorado Governor Richard D. Lamm.
He has urged that rates for hydroelectric power generated by federal
dams in the Upper Basin be raised from their present below-market
levels 175 to produce enough revenue to construct water projects
needed by Upper Basin states. 1 76 A federal enactment would be required to reflect current construction costs of new projects in the Colorado River Storage Project rate base. 177 Funds available to a state
would be limited to a sum sufficient to reach a level of water development anticipated by the water projects Congress has already authorized for the state. Thus, states would still have to consider the relative
economic and other benefits of projects, forcing them to choose only
the most important projects to be built. They would not need to build
the authorized projects but could build smaller projects, repair and
rehabilitate existing facilities, and make existing water uses more
efficient.
Whatever sources of capital are used for future water projects,
public or private, financing will be more difficult. Capital markets are
174. Stanfield, Governors. Mayors Turn from Seeking More Power to Fending Off Aid Cuts, National Journal, January 22, 1983 at 166. The States' Red-Ink Blues, Newsweek Feb. 28, 1983, at 19;
Chart, Fiscal Condition of the 50 States, National Journal, February 5, 1983, at 295.
175. See supra notes 89-91, and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 99.

177. The Colorado River Storage Project as amended limits rates to an amount necessary to repay
the costs of authorized facilities within the project, costs of operation, maintenance, replacement and
salinity control. 43 U.S.C. § 620d (1982). See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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now and will, for the foreseeable future, be dominated by massive federal borrowing to finance deficit spending and to service the national
debt. All borrowers, whether governmental or private, will encounter
stiff competition and high interest rates. The limited availability and
high cost of money surely will limit construction of water projects to
those that are the most needed.
2. Environmental Limitations
The limited number of feasible sites is a significant restraint on
construction of major new storage facilities. Reservoirs already have
been built at the sites best located and configured for water storage.
Many remaining sites are unacceptable for environmental reasons.
Dam building can be unacceptable to the public because it harms natural assets. In the 1950s, plans for the Echo Park Dam on the Yampa
River were dropped when the project encountered strong opposition
because it would have flooded a significant portion of Dinosaur National Monument. The Colorado River Storage Project Act would not
have passed without the Echo Park. The Act was needed to fund
projects so the Upper Basin states could use their Compact share and
satisfy Compact obligations to the Lower Basin.178 A similar battle
was fought over congressional authorization of the Marble Canyon
and Bridge Canyon Dams that were proposed to be located above and
below Grand Canyon, and which would have altered the River's flow
through the Grand Canyon National Monument. Deletion of the proposal allowed the passage of the Colorado River Basin Project Act
which authorized the Central Arizona Project. 79 Environmentalists
were unsuccessful, however, in their efforts to prevent Lake Powell
(behind Glen Canyon Dam) from being completely filled; they argued
that it would impair the scenic beauty and jeopardize the integrity of
Rainbow Bridge National Monument.1 8 °
Because of the high level of existing development, the efficacy of
new water projects for the Basin as a whole is questionable. Some
studies show that because of huge evaporative losses-now approaching 2,000,000 acre-feet a year from Colorado River reservoirs 1 8 - the
178. Mann, Conflict and Coalition: Political Variables Underlying Water Resource Development in
the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 141, 154-56 (1975).
179. Id. at 158-61.
180. Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171
(1974). See also Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981)

(rejecting claims of Navajo Indians that the filling of Lake Powell and Park Service access policies
would interfere with religious practices centering around Rainbow Bridge, a traditionally sacred area).
181. Under current operating conditions evaporation is estimated at 599,000 acre-feet from Upper Basin reservoirs and 1,120,000 acre-feet from Lower Basin reservoirs. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR, supra note 162, at 24, 32.
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useful limits of storage as drought protection have been reached. 8 2
Nevertheless, new storage still may be needed to meet local or regional
needs.
More than ever before, there is a solid front of political opposition
to further large project development on the River. Zeal for total exploitation has been tempered as threats to the River's native elegance
increase. Citizens' groups have become increasingly vocal, insisting
that some of the West's natural amenities be saved from subjugation to
human enterprise. The enchantment of the early explorers has been
rekindled in those who believe that some of the River belongs to wildlife, or that stretches must be preserved so that unborn generations can
have glimpses of what enthralled John Wesley Powell in his epic, 1869
scientific exploration-turned-adventure. 8 3
Today, opponents of dam development rely on more than aesthetic preferences and appeals based on the importance of protecting
our natural heritage. They cite the economic value of recreation and
tourism.' 84 Further, they have strong allies in fiscal conservatives; together they insist on the necessity to restrain government spending for
water projects. States must carefully rethink the importance of longplanned water projects and must study new financing mechanisms for
projects that are needed. 185 As cost-effectiveness becomes a paramount consideration, expenditures of limited funds are likely to be for
small regional projects, water conservation measures, and rehabilitation of existing facilities.
B. Efficient Agricultural Use
Federal and state studies of agricultural water use have universally urged better conservation efforts.'8 6 Increased efficiency could
alleviate shortages and extend supplies. Just as the United States
"found" a significant supply of oil through conservation during the
energy crisis of the 1970's, 1 87 water could be found through water con182. Hardison, Potential United States Water-Supply Development, J. Irrigation and Drainage Division, 1972 Proc. Am. Soc'y Civ. Engineers 479 (Sept. 1972); Langbein, Water Yield and Reservoir
Storage in the United States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIR. 409 (1959).
183. J. POWELL, THE EXPLORATIONS OF THE COLORADO RIVER AND ITS CANYONS (1961).
184. See supra notes 14445 and accompanying text.
185.

E.g., R. SMITH, TROUBLED WATERS: FINANCING WATER IN THE WEST (1985).

186.

E.g., NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 227-30 (1973);

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, CRITICAL WATER PROBLEMS FACING THE ELEVEN WESTERN

STATES (1975); U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES 1975-2000;
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER

RIGHTS LAW 71-72 (1978) (list of measures recommended to increase efficiency of water use).
187. For example, in 1983 gasoline consumption in the United States dropped to 6.1 million
barrels per day, far less than the peak of 7.6 million barrels per day in 1978; less even than the 6.4
million barrels per day used in 1972. U.S. News and World Report, Feb. 21, 1983, at 65.
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servation measures. There are tremendous opportunities for conservation of water in agriculture.18 One report estimates that irrigation
water waste annually amounts to some 24,000,000 acre-feet. 8 9 Because most water use in the Colorado River Basin is for agriculture,' 90
irrigation efficiency is of particular concern.
There are promising technologies for conserving agricultural
water including: new drip irrigation systems instead of flooding fields;
gated pipes to reduce seepage, evaporation, and evapotranspiration instead of open ditches; laser leveling of fields to reduce runoff; electronic sensors to indicate with precision how much water is needed;
computers to schedule irrigation; and a variety of other approaches.' 9 '
But technologies are costly and may not be economically justified or
accommodated by present state laws.
1. Legal Doctrine and Conservation
One has never had a right to waste water under the prior appropriation system; the right is only to put water to a "beneficial use."' 192
If a use is within the state law definition of beneficial use, i.e., an agricultural use, a municipal use, etc., there are few opportunities to ask
whether all the water used is necessary for the beneficial use or
whether the use is relatively less beneficial than other possible uses.
Thus, senior irrigators may hold rights to, and may actually divert and
consume, far more water than they need. Some believe full use of
water rights is necessary to maintain the quantity of their rights,
although the trend in state law is to discourage such practices.
The concept of beneficial use is maturing. Courts are increasingly
demanding more than simply putting water to some use that is nominally "beneficial." The Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted beneficial use to require the use to be consistent with maximum utilization
of the water. Thus "it is implicit in these constitutional provisions
[stating that 'the right to divert unappropriated waters of any natural
188. Eg., U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, MORE AND BETTER USES COULD BE MADE OF BILLIONS OF GALLONS OF WATER BY IMPROVING IRRIGATION DELIVERY SYSTEMS

(1977);

GAO CED-77-117

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BETTER WATER MANAGEMENT POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS NEED TO BE OVERCOME GAO CED-79-1 (1978).

BUT

189. U.S. Soil Conservation Service, Crop Consumptive Irrigation Requirements and Irrigation
Efficiency Coefficients for the United States, appendix to NATIONAL ANALYSIS, SECOND NATIONAL
WATER ASSESSMENT (1976). See generally, Pring & Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriersto Conservation and Efficient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1 (1979).
190. Gardner & Stewart, Agriculture and Salinity Control in the Colorado River Basin, 15 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 63, 64 (1975).
191. See generally U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSISTANCE, WATER-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN U.S. ARID/SEMIARID LANDS (1983).
192. See Note, Water Waste - Ascertainment and Abatement, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 449 (1973).
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stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied'] that, along with vested
rights, there shall be maximum utilization of the water of this state."
The Court said that this followed from the "principle that the right to
water does not give the right to waste it." 19 Similar approaches have
been taken in other states. 194
The most notable legal restriction is that one may only transfer to
another the right to use the quantity of water that has historically been
consumed for a beneficial use. 195 This may be an amount other than
simply the difference between the amount diverted and the amount
returned to the stream. In quantifying historical use, Colorado courts
will determine the amount of water required for the particular purposes to which it has been applied. Evidence may include soil conditions, proximity to the stream, crop 196
requirements, average
precipitation, and the efficiency of irrigation.
Courts generally hold that the means of diversion must be reasonably efficient. They differ on the time when reasonableness is determined and on the consequences of finding that the means are
unreasonable. In one case, the Montana Supreme court found that an
earth and debris wing dam was "reasonable" by contemporary standards when it was built and therefore would be protected against upstream diversions that rendered it useless. 197 But the Oregon Supreme
Court said that while crude and inefficient diversion means may be
adequate to establish a right by appropriation, more efficient, modern
methods must be adopted when available. 19' The United States
Supreme Court has suggested, too, that an unreasonable and inefficient
means of diversion cannot be maintained where it interferes with the
reasonable use of water by others. 199
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a groundwater
pumper must have a "reasonable means of diversion" in order to be
protected against aquifer depletions by other pumpers who render the
pumper's well useless.2' The principle has not been fully extended to
193. E.g., Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 336, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (1968).
194. Eg., Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 578, 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1971);
Glenn Dale Ranches, Inc. v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585, 494 P.2d 1029 (1972); Kaiser Steel v. W. S. Ranch

Co., 81 N.M. 414, 467 P.2d 986 (1970); Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 215 Ore. 523, 336 P.2d 884
(1959); Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Texas Dept. of Water Resources, 638 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982); In re Waters Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 10 Utah 2d 77, 348 P.2d 679
(1960); Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1978).
195. City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
196. E.g., Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962).
197. State ex rel Crowley v. District Court, 108 Mont. 89, 88 P.2d 23 (1939).
198. In re Willow Creek, 74 Ore. 592, 144 P. 505 (1914). Cf In re Water Rights in Silvies River,

115 Ore. 27, 237 P. 322 (1925).
199. Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107, 113 (1912).

200. City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
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the use of surface water, but the Colorado court has suggested that we
may be entering an era when irrigation ditch lining can be required. 20 1
Recent cases judge reasonableness of a diversion in light of today's
technology and conditions. A leaky, unlined irrigation ditch that was
the state of the art seventy-five years ago may be found wasteful today
and lose legal protection as against others whose water use would be
limited by protecting the inefficient diversion. A simpler, more severe
method is to count all water lost by a ditch or other delivery system as
delivered in satisfaction of one's water right.20 2
Requirements for efficient diversion methods and historical use
limitations can be applied in a variety of ways. Some states demand a
forfeiture of water rights that are used wastefully.2" 3 Traditionally
forfeiture has been applied to terminate water rights not used at all for
a statutory period. As the definition of beneficial use evolves to require efficiency, enforcement of the forfeiture laws can be an especially
powerful tool to eliminate waste. A forfeiture proceeding need not
await a proposed change in use but can be initiated at any time and, in
some states, by anyone.
Basinwide management is an especially important means of water
conservation. Water users depending on the same stream or portion of
a stream system can cooperate to make the resource go farther. The
prior appropriation doctrine allows senior users to use their full legal
rights, even when it means applying water in larger amounts than is
necessary, and to store water, even as junior users get none. There is
no requirement that shortages be shared. But water users are learning
to share storage facilities and to trade or lease water in times of
shortage to stretch supplies and maximize overall benefits. Payments
to those with senior rights recognize their rights while holders of junior rights can use water when they would not otherwise be able to do
so. Basinwide management depends on the availability of data concerning existing supplies and legal rights; an ability to make reliable
projections about future water needs and natural supplies; and the
means to exchange information among water users. Computer technology and aggressive state programs to encourage cooperative efforts
can lead to successful basinwide management.
The Law of the River should not be viewed as a disincentive to
201. A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 196 Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57 (1978).
202. Glenn Dale Ranches v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585, 494 P.2d 1029 (1972).
203. E.g., State v. McLean 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983, 988-89 (1957). See generally Shupe,
Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. REv. 483 (1982). Abandonment of
water rights, as opposed to forfeiture, requires a showing of intent to abandon as well as non-use. To
further the policy of extinguishing unused rights, some courts have adopted a rebuttable presumption of
an intent to abandon. Eg., Rand v. Pitsch, 666 P.2d 215 (Mont. 1983).
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conservation. It might be argued that it is in the interest of the Upper
Basin states not to use water efficiently so long as their full Compact
entitlements are unused. The argument rests on a misconception that
the Compact requires a state to "use it or lose it." Compact negotiations were, of course, animated by the Upper Basin's desire to protect
a share of water so that it could develop later than the Lower Basin, at
its own pace. The result reflects that purpose. It could only be
changed if the Compact were renegotiated or the Lower Basin states
succeeded in getting the United States Supreme Court to review the
matter under equitable apportionment principles.2 °4 In the unlikely
event that judicial or legislative scrutiny were focused on the "equity"
of an allocation of uses between the Upper and Lower Basins, a full,
but wasteful, early Upper Basin use would not "protect" Upper Basin
Compact apportionments. The Supreme Court has held in a recent
equitable apportionment case, that a prior, established New Mexico
water use could not be sustained against a new Colorado use where the
older use was wasteful and the newer use efficient.2 °5 The decision
suggests that the Court would look carefully at the relative efficiencies
of competing uses in the two basins and that prior but inefficient Upper Basin uses would provide little protection.
2. Conservation and Economics
The most effective boon to efficient water use is pricing. There is
broad agreement that water conservation would be promoted if water
were priced to reflect the direct and indirect costs of development,
storage, transportation, quality protection, and delivery.2 °6 Agricultural water use is especially sensitive to price increases.2" 7 Subsidies
have made users' costs artificially low, creating an incentive for irrigators to apply water with little consideration for the overall costs to
society. As water is attracted to new and more profitable uses, its
price to all users will rise, reflecting more closely its real value to society. Therefore, if agricultural users are to survive, their water use
practices must change.
For many, farming is marginally profitable, at best. Although
some improvements in water efficiency can be costly, because improve204. See supra notes 34 and 36, and accompanying text.
205. Colorado v. New Mexico, 103 S. Ct. 539 (1982). In later considering the case the Court
upheld New Mexico's claim because Colorado could not yet show concrete plans to demonstrate the
new, efficient uses it intended. New Mexico v. Colorado, 104 S. Ct. 2433, 2442 (1984).
206. Meyers & Posner, Toward an Improved Market in Water Resources, in NATIONAL WATER
COMMISSION, LEGAL STUDY No. 4 (1971).
207.

L. GISSER, R. MYERS & R. RESTA, WATER DEMAND AND SUPPLY IN THE ALBUQUERQUE

URBAN AREA 1975-2030 at 24-27 (1977).
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ments in conveyancing and storage systems to eliminate seepage, evaporation, and evapotranspiration require expensive construction, other
efficiency enhancing measures are not. Ceasing application of water in
excess of crop needs, lining ditches with cheap plastic film, and removing water-sucking phreatophytes along ditches and streams are all relatively inexpensive and improve efficiency greatly.
Because irrigation water is usually applied at times and in
amounts dictated by the extent of one's water rights and by custom
rather than by need, water usage could be reduced without negative
economic effects by seeking to optimize crop yield, rather than maximizing it.2 ° 8 Ideally, farmers should apply less water per acre as water
costs increase faster than the relative increase in crop prices. Somewhat less may be produced per acre, but the cost of production (specifically the cost of water) can be reduced dramatically. Thus, lower
yields may be as profitable, even more profitable, if water saving techniques are used. Conversion to new techniques may be induced by
rising water costs.
As water cost rises, farmers may shift to higher valued crops (e.g.,
vegetables, citrus, and nuts). The farmer's return from the same land
can increase while using less water. But a shift is risky and may require a high initial investment and greater production costs. If too
many farmers shift crops, the market can become saturated, driving
down prices and profits. The extent of demand for certain new crops
(e.g., guayule, jojoba, crambe, buffalo gourd) that require less water or
that can be produced with saline water, is unknown. In addition,
knowledge of the means of production and processing and marketing
facilities are limited. Extensive research in this area is warranted.
Other inexpensive and immediately available measures for reducing
water use while increasing yields include innovative cropping practices
such as rotating crops, multiple cropping, and leaving crop residues
(minimizing tillage).2 "9
Although market pricing of water is inhibited by political resistance (especially where it could cause difficulties for farmers and ranchers),2 10 the surviving agricultural enterprises might enjoy a strong,
profitable business if prices for their products reflected the increased
costs. This depends in part on whether they could, or would, need to
208. See Lacewell & Collins, Implications and Management Alternatives for Western Irrigated
Agriculture, Technical Article 17807 of the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station (n.d.).
209. Id
210. A. KNEESE & F. BROWN, supra note 60, at 73, 92. "It is the human institutions that prevent
. . . the transfer of water from agricultural uses into other, more highly valued uses."
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compete with similar products from other regions.
If agriculturalists are induced to sell their water rights, they
should be compensated for their reasonable expectations of economic
gain from farming, not forced to accept a distress price. A healthy
market should be fair to those who sell rights, while moving water use
to the highest valued, most efficient purposes. Of course, the market
ignores personal preferences for fanning over a cash payoff, and may
disregard the intangible value of maintaining a viable pastoral society.
Virtually all Colorado River Basin states allow transfers of water
rights. Markets in water are inhibited, however, by steep transaction
costs including fees for lawyers and experts. Most change of use procedures are designed to protect all existing uses regardless of their
value relative to the new use. In applying the rule, it may be appropriate to demand that an existing use be reasonably efficient before it
could prevent a change in use.
A significant impediment to market transactions in water is the
rule that prohibits reuse or successive uses of water on land other than
the land for which the water was originally appropriated.2 12 If a water
user invests money and labor to conserve water that once was consumed, the law does not ordinarily allow the water saved to be used on
other land or to be sold to another. California, however, has recently
enacted legislation giving the benefit of conservation efforts to the salvager.2213t Such laws allow agricultural users to finance water conservation with sales of water saved. Municipal and industrial growth may
be sustained on savings in agricultural consumption and farms that
might otherwise have been dried up can survive on less water.
Water interests in southern California are discussing perhaps the
grandest agricultural water conservation scheme ever. The Metropolitan Water District of southern California (MWD) has sought additional supplies to meet anticipated shortfalls when Arizona begins
using its full Compact apportionment. The Imperial Irrigation District (IID) is the largest of a few agricultural users that consume most
of California's apportionment of Colorado River water, and which
have top priority for that water. Following a State Water Resources
Control Board decision that found that the IID was misusing vast
amounts of River water,21 4 the IID moved to accept an Environmental
211. Lacewell & Collins, supra note 208, conclude that the impacts of water prices in the Colorado River Basin are unlikely to reach beyond the region.
212. Eg., Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n. v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d 201
(1966).
213. CAL. WATER. CODE §§ 380-386, 1009-1011 (1984).
214. In Re Alleged Waste and Unreasonable Use of Water by Imperial Irrigation District, California State Water Resources Control Board, Decision No. 1600 (June 21, 1984); see also Elmore v.
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Defense Fund suggestion that municipal
and lined canals for IID in return for a
water consumption. The proposal could
400,000 acre-feet of water yearly which

users pay the cost of pipes
share of IID's reduction in
result in IID saving up to
would then be available to

MWD.2 15

Conceivably, Lower Basin interests could pay for all or part of
the cost of water-saving measures to control Upper Basin agricultural
consumption and thereby to maximize the amount of deliverable surpluses over the guaranteed Compact deliveries, without reducing
Compact entitlements needed for Upper Basin users. Some studies
show that the marginal value of water used in the Lower Basin far
exceeds that of water used in the Upper Basin.2 16 Consequently,
although investments in water conserving technologies in the Upper
Basin may not seem justified to Upper Basin users, the Lower Basin
may be interested in contributing to the effort.
More efficient agricultural use could make more water available
for growth in all of the Colorado River Basin states, most immediately
in the water-short Lower Basin. It also could ease competition between agriculture and other users as the Upper Basin grows. To the
extent more water were kept in streams it would address the needs of
wildlife and recreationists. In a time of limited funds for water
projects, investments in water efficiency may be especially wise. Like
storage projects, conservation through more efficient use can help Upper Basin states to make guaranteed Compact deliveries to the Lower
Basin in dry periods. Indeed, increased efficiency can provide a substantial cushion against the vicissitudes of nature at lower cost than
large storage facilities. Where necessary, state laws must be changed
to allow those who invest in water efficiency to be able to reap the
benefits.
C. Salinity Control
The consumable limits of the Colorado River may be felt first not
in the quantity of water it produces but in the quality of the water.
Salinity is the main quality problem of the River-increased concentration of dissolved solids.2 17 The problem has many natural causes,
Imperial Irrigation Dist., 159 Cal. App. 3d 185 (1985) (district has duty to avoid wasting water and

causing excessive drainage). Measures to conserve water had been urged by environmentalists. Environmental Defense Fund Letter, June 1983.
215. Holburt, Agreements Could Stretch Colorado'sSupply, 18 Colorado River Association News
Letter 3 1983.

216. B. Harding, Possibilities for Unified Operation in a Divided Basin (May, 1984) (unpublished
manuscript).
217. A. KNEESE & F. BROWN, THE SOUTHWEST UNDER STREss 46-47 (1981). See U.S. ENvi-
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but is exacerbated by human activity. Highly saline water from salt
springs, and runoff picking up salts from underlying soils is made
worse by the evaporation of water in reservoirs which expose large
water surfaces to the air for a long time, and by the addition of agricultural return flows that increase in salt concentrations as water leaches
salts from cultivated fields during successive reuse.
1. The Need To Reduce Salinity
The impetus to control salinity of the Colorado River comes from
two sources. The federal government has assumed a legal obligation to
deliver water to Mexico having a maximum salt content. Although
the Mexican obligation was the primary reason for a salinity control
program, the driving force of salinity control efforts now is a desire to
protect the Lower Basin economies. A multi-faceted federal program
of salinity control and reduction includes improvements in the transportation and application of agricultural water, interception of natural
salt sources, and grandiose schemes to remove salts from the River's
water once it reaches the Lower Basin.21 8
A major international controversy with Mexico was touched off
when salinity levels in water reaching Mexico at the foot of the River
rose dramatically to 2,700 parts per million (ppm) in 1961, making it
useless for irrigation. The Welton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage
District in Southern Arizona had begun dumping saline wastes in the
River. These wastes were pumped from over a hundred wells drilled
by the Bureau of Reclamation to remove saline groundwater. The
water table was rising because of excessive application of irrigation
water imported to the district from the Colorado, and was killing
crops. The saline waste water was inadequately diluted in the River
because of heavy United States consumption and because the Glen
Canyon Dam was being filled.21 9
The 1944 Treaty entitling Mexico to 1,500,000 acre-feet a year of
Colorado River water did not address water quality. 22 ° But negotiaRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE MINERAL QUALITY PROBLEM IN THE COLORADO RIVER
BASIN -

SUMMARY REPORT (1971); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, QUALITY OF WATER IN

COLORADO RIVER BASIN, PROGRESS REPORT No. 12 at 12-14 (1984) [hereinafter cited as QUALITY OF
WATER]. The history of the Colorado River salinity problem and the legal issues are covered in the
several articles in the InternationalSymposium on the Salinity of the Colorado River, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1-239 (1975) [hereinafter cited as InternationalSymposium].
218. InternationalSymposium, supra note 217.
219. Bulson, Colorado River Salinity Problem: Has a Solution Been Found?,9 INT'L. LAW. 283,
285 (1975); Brownell & Eaton, The ColoradoRiver Salinity Problem with Mexico, 69 AM. J. INT'L. L.
255, 256 (1975).
220. Treaty with Mexico, Feb. 3, 1944, T.S. No. 994, 59 Stat. 1219. See Meyers & Noble, The

ColoradoRiver: The Treaty with Mexico, 19 STAN. L. REV. 367 (1966-67).
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tions produced assurances that water deliveries would be of a certain
quality. In 1965 an agreement was reached by the International
Boundary and Water Commission requiring Welton-Mohawk drainage water to be returned to the River below the Morelos Dam, the
Mexican diversion point.22 1 This led to the construction of elaborate
drainage works. After some remedial measures were taken, the concentration of dissolved solids in 1968 was 1,269 ppm while about
twenty miles upstream at the Imperial Dam in the United States the
concentration was 811 ppm. 22 2 Mexico remained dissatisfied. In 1972,
the United States agreed to substitute higher quality water for the
drainage water sent south of the border.22 3 Then, in 1973, the United
States promised to construct a desalination plant above Morelos
Dam.2 24 The agreement was implemented by the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act which authorized the plant and associated
works.22 5
2. The Salinity Control Program
The desalination plant being constructed at Yuma, Arizona, will
cost nearly half a billion dollars,2 26 some five times the original estimates, and is scheduled for completion in 1989.227 The United States
could have eliminated the need for the plant by buying the farms in all
or a portion of the Welton-Mohawk project, many of which were not
productive or profitable enough to justify their use of huge quantities
of water. Though it would have been a cheaper solution to the problem, it was politically infeasible.
A package of controls was included in the 1974 Colorado River
Basin Salinity Control Act. 22 8 The measures include construction of
projects to avoid returns of highly saline irrigation water, canal lining,
interception of natural sources of salinity, and wells to develop supplemental water. Possible measures to reduce water use through economic incentives or charges, or requiring improved irrigation
221. Minute 218, 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 545 (1965); 55 Department of State Bulletin 555
(1965).
222. See Martin, Economic Magnitudes and Economic Alternatives in Lower Basin Use of Colorado River Water, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 229 (1975).
223. Minute 241, 67 Department of State Bulletin 198 (1972).
224. Minute 242, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1105 (1973); 69 DEP'T ST. BULL. 395 (1973).
225. Act of June 24, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1591).

226. Telephone interview with Glen Billings, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Yuma, Arizona
(March 1, 1985).
227. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 2 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, F.Y. 1984, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, pp. BR-282, BR-287 (1982).
228. 43 U.S.C. § 1591.
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efficiency 229 are not parts of the program, although it had been suggested that these methods would be cost effective.2 a°
The Bureau of Reclamation estimates the future damage to
Lower Basin users from each milligram per liter (mg/l) of total dissolved solids (salts) to be $561,000.211 Seven salinity control projects
have been completed or are under construction. Only two are in the
Lower Basin. Four involve improvements to agricultural irrigation
systems or on individual farms (Coachella Valley, California; Lower
Gunnison, Colorado; Grand Valley, Colorado; McElmo Creek, Colorado).232 One (Las Vegas Wash, Nevada) is designed to control seepage of wastewater from manmade sources in a natural drainage
channel. Two control natural sources of salt (Meeker Dome, Colorado, and Paradox Valley, Colorado). And another dozen projects are
being studied.233
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (now the Clean Water
Act), 234 as well as the 1974 Salinity Control Act, apply to salinity control. The Clean Water Act regulates water quality, requiring limitations on salt concentrations. The government sets effluent standards
restricting the amounts of various pollutants that can be discharged
from "point sources" such as pipes and ditches.235 Discharges are
subject to permits under a "National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System" (NPDES). Irrigation return flows outside the definition of
"point sources, ' 236 although they may contain agricultural chemicals
(as well as dissolved solids) that can cause serious pollution
problems.237 The Clean Water Act also provides federal authority to
229. See Mann, Politics in the United States and the Salinity Problem of the Colorado River, 15
NAT. RESOURCES J. 113, 126-27 (1975).
230. Martin, supra note 225; S. WEATHERFORD, WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN
U.S.: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION AND MARKETS 29 (1982).
231. J.KLEINMAN & N. BROWN, COLORADO RIVER SALINITY, ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURAL, MUNICIPAL, AND INDUSTRIAL USERS (1980); QUALITY OF WATER, supra note 218, at 15.

The damage estimate is in 1984 dollars, based on concentrations of dissolved solids at Imperial Dam.
232. QUALITY OF WATER, supra note 218, at 65-77.
233. Id. at 77-90 (1982).
234. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
235. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
236. A point source is defined as:
any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe,
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may
be discharged. This term does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982). The last sentence of the definition was added in 1977 after an administrative exemption was overturned. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For legislative
history see 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4326. It is possible, though unlikely, that Congress
will close the gap in coverage of the Act left by exemption of agricultural irrigation. See Lazarus,
Nonpoint Source Pollution, 2 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 176 (1977).
237. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 186, at 66-67.
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control the overall water quality of streams. The job of issuing
NPDES permits is usually assigned to the states, 238 but if they do not
take sufficient action to preserve water quality, the United States may
intercede.239
Congress failed to create any Basinwide entity or management
system to deal with salinity control. In 1973, however, the Basin

states formed the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum because of mutual concerns about federal programs under the Clean
Water Act and the Salinity Control Act. The governors of each state
appointed representatives to the Forum. In 1975, the Forum set Clean
Water Act water quality standards for salinity and developed an implementation plan for controlling salinity levels. Numeric salinity

standards reflected average concentrations at three points in the
Lower River. The plan relied largely on federally-funded construction
of salinity control projects authorized by the Colorado River Salinity

Control Act. The Forum and its member states have actively advocated funding and construction of the projects, recognizing full use of
Compact-apportioned waters of the River may be impossible if the
standards cannot be met. The Forum has become a model for interstate cooperation.

A number of proposed salinity control projects will not be built
because they are infeasible, uneconomic, or have been subject to local
opposition. Further, there is no assurance that the projects, once built,

will be as effective as planned. Consequently, the Forum has developed policies which encourage industrial use of brackish and saline
water and which urge NPDES permitting by the Basin states that will
limit point source discharges of salts. 24
The Basinwide approach to water quality, without salinity standards or monitoring within, or at, the borders of each state, has been
238. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982). Congress decided to give the states primary authority to set
standards for the quality of waters within their boundaries. It was concerned that centralizing the
function would upset the delicate balance of federalism concerns in the Clean Water Act. See H.R.
REP. No. 215, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3313, 3320-23.
239. State plans and standards for water quality maintenance and control are to be submitted to
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1982). They then
must be reviewed and revised every three years. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(cXl) (1982). The Administrator
determines whether the standards are consistent with the Act's requirements. If not, the Administrator
adopts criteria and standards for water quality. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3), (c)(4)(B) (1982). The Agency
has authority to override water quality standards by changing effluent limitations set out in a point
source discharge permit if the Administrator believes the permitted discharge would interfere with
water quality. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982). It also sets the scientific criteria by which states are to establish their standards. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (1982). Broad supervisory authority over water quality
standards, including discretion in the Administrator to promulgate substitute standards, has been sustained. Fg., Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cit. 1980).
240. QUALrrY OF WATER, supra note 217, at 97-98.
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judicially sustained over challenges by the Environmental Defense
Fund that it violated the Clean Water Act.2 41 Had the Court forced
the states or the Environmental Protection Agency to set more rigorous salinity standards, the standards could only be carried out through
NPDES permitting. Because most salinity is contributed by irrigation
returns and natural sources which are not point sources subject to permits, reductions in salinity would have been minimal.
Future water development will have additional impact on salinity. Evaporation from new reservoirs and added salt pick up from
expanded irrigation uses can increase salt loading. Thus, the federal
government may be reluctant to assist new projects. Exports from the
Basin can reduce total salts in the River, but if diversions of relatively
unsalty water are made, the present benefit of dilution is lost, so the
effect of particular projects must be examined. The type and timing of
new depletions and water projects will determine whether standards
actually will be met. Considering current plans, the Bureau of Reclamation estimates that current salinity standards can be met until
1993.242

Salinity control projects are financed by the federal government
which requires repayment of a portion of project costs from the revenues recovered by the Upper and Lower Basin hydroelectric facilities.2 43 Legislation passed in 1984 amended the ten-year-old Salinity
Control Act to express a preference among proposed salinity control
projects for the most cost-effective measures. The amendments also
increased the share of costs repayable from Basin hydroelectric power
revenues for newly authorized projects from twenty-five to thirty percent, and imposed market interest rates on the amounts that are to be
repaid.2 " Further, the amendments broadened the scope of Bureau
authority to build salinity control projects, so that if all projects are
funded and built, numeric salinity criteria can be met through 2005.245
Mounting federal deficits, however, may cause a rethinking of the federal role in salinity control. Federal spending for the least cost-effective authorized projects,246 as well as for additional measures to satisfy
criteria beyond 2005, may be curtailed, casting greater burdens on the
Basin states and water users.
241. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
242. QUALITY OF WATER, supra note 217, at 57-60, 101-02. Estimates assume average flows,
construction of salinity control projects now authorized or built, and reasonable estimates of water
development.
243. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620d(d)(5), 1543(0 (1982).
244. Pub. L. No. 98-569, - Stat. -.
245. QUALITY OF WATER, supra note 217, Salinity Update (Jan. 1985).
246. The most cost effective projects now in the planning stage will result in only small salinity
reductions. See QUALITY OF WATER, supra note 217, at 63.
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The Colorado River Salinity Control Forum must lead the quest
for additional effective salinity control measures as the practical limits
of structural solutions are reached. Possibilities include: dilution by
augmented river flows through cloudseeding and other measures; further on-farm improvements in areas of high salt leaching; land use
controls; conversion from irrigation to other uses; and reduction in
consumption by imposing charges on reclamation project water, retirement of agricultural lands, limitations on water project development, and conservation measures. Alternatively, the salinity
standards could be relaxed. Lower Basin agricultural users could
adapt to higher salinity levels by planting salt-resistent crops and municipal and industrial users could treat or dilute saltier water.
Economic arrangements among Basin states can help reduce salinity and place costs of improving water quality on those who benefit.
Once federal willingness to support salinity control measures has been
exhausted, the Lower Basin states as the primary beneficiaries, may
have to pay the costs of salinity control. Lower Basin users could gain
from improvements in the Upper Basin that reduce salt pickup and
from retirement of Upper Basin agricultural land. Upper Basin states
cannot be expected to share appreciably in the cost of such controls
that benefit only Lower Basin economies. Nor should water consumed by salinity control measures be charged against waters apportioned to the Upper Basin states.
The Colorado River Salinity Control Forum has been a remarkably effective vehicle for interstate cooperation; it is a paradigm for consensus problem solving in the Colorado River Basin. The Forum
should be capable of addressing the difficult future salinity problems in
a way that will induce the member states to make wise economic decisions and exercise their sovereignty to regulate salt-loading. New
roles, like brokering innovative economic arrangements, should be
within the Forum's ability. The most difficult decisions for the Forum
lie ahead, however, as choices must be made and responsibility allocated for further salinity control efforts. A failure to confront those
choices will, however, lead to congressional intervention and solutions
in which the states will have less authority.
D. Management of InterdependentSupplies
The greatest usage of Colorado River water is outside the Basin,
though within the seven Basin states. Uses of all water sources available to the Basin states, such as streams in other watersheds and
groundwater, are necessarily related. Furthermore, other basins, even
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those far from the Basin states, can be considered sources for augmenting Basin supplies.
Extra-Basin use of Colorado River water creates an interdependence with many other watersheds in the West. California has water
delivery contracts with the Secretary of the Interior for 5,362,000 acrefeet per year of Colorado River water, well in excess of its Compact
entitlement of 4,400,000 acre-feet.24 7 The state will have to curtail its
water use as the Central Arizona Project begins to operate (about
1986). To the extent the River's water is inadequate for southern California, water must be drawn from the California State Water Project
which is supplied by river systems hundreds of miles to the north.
There have been proposals to augment supplies in the Basin states
with imported water. Exxon eyed imports from the Missouri River
Basin at one point in its planning for oil shale development in western
Colorado.24 From time to time, the Southwest has focused on the far
North as a potential source of water. Projects to move water from
distant basins such as the Snake, the Columbia, the MacKenzie, and
the Yukon have been discussed.24 9 Protectionist sentiment in the Columbia River Basin led the late Senator Henry Jackson to press for
and obtain a twenty-year moratorium on further research or planning
for transbasin diversions from that area.2 50
A variety of ideas to augment Colorado River water supplies
from sources other than imports also are being discussed by the states.
One possibility is massive cloudseeding. Extensive testing is needed to
determine whether sufficient additional water could be produced to
247. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS 45 (W. L. Kahrl ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WATER ATLAS].
248. The Role of Synthetic Fuels in the United States' Energy Future, Rocky Mountain News,
Dec. 6, 1980, at 10.
249. Some of the ambitious plans that have been suggested include:
Pacific Southwest Water Plan: The wild rivers of California's North Coast would be
dammed and their waters distributed as far south as Arizona at a cost of $2.4 billion.
Snake-ColoradoProject: Five million acre-feet of water would be brought south through
eastern Oregon to the lower Colorado at a cost of $3.2 billion.
Western Water Plan: Fifteen million acre-feet would be brought through an elaborate
system of pumping stations and reservoirs from the Columbia River to Lake Mead on the
Colorado at an estimated cost of $11 billion.
NESCO Plan: A $20 billion fiberglass pipeline would follow the continental shelf of
California, carrying four million acre-feet of north coast river water to serve population centers along the coast.
North American Water and Power Alliance: Water supplies would move from as far
north as the Yukon River through Canada, connecting with major rivers there and then linking waterways from coast to coast to augment supplies at a cost of some $200 billion.
WATER ATLAS, supra note 247, at 107.
250. 43 U.S.C. § 1511 (1982) (as amended by the Reclamation Safety of Dams Act, Pub. L. No.
95-578, § 10, 92 Stat. 2471 (1978)).
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justify a regular weather modification program and to determine the
effects that would be felt by the states where greater snowfall or rain
may be experienced. Another proposal is to clear-cut patches of timber in Upper Basin forests to increase snowpack and, hence, runoff. It
is not yet clear how much water could be added to the River system
from such programs.
Colorado River Basin states have not addressed the question of
how much water they will allow to be diverted out of the Basin. Any
water project imposes costs and burdens on people besides those who
will use the water. This is especially true of transbasin diversions.
Massive water exports can affect the economy, ecology, lifestyle, and
potential for future growth of an area.25 Colorado insists that conservancy districts which move water out of the Colorado River Basin
satisfy requirements for "compensatory storage" of water for future
in-Basin needs.2 52 California law gives the area of origin an absolute

priority over exporters to appropriate water if and when it is
needed.2 5 3
Area of origin protections tend to inhibit efficient transfers of
water, but may be socially justified. Large "compensatory storage"
projects can be wasteful. Unless the project is in a location and of a
kind that will meet foreseeable needs, the requirement is merely a way
of deterring exports with little benefit accruing to the area of origin.
The facility may remain unused for many years. Protection to areas of
origin can assist in preserving agriculture, which has difficulty competing with municipal and industrial uses. Although individual farmers
may be adequately compensated when they sell their water rights,
there may be other societal values in farmland preservation that are
not adequately represented in the marketplace.
Open space, bucolic vistas, and stable small-town cultures may be
worth preserving. If lands are to be preserved as open space for the
good of all, exporters might be required to pay for conservation easements on lands taken out of agriculture by water diversions. A state
might create a fund from export charges or taxes to be used for future
water project development and related needs in the area of origin. For
instance, the fund could be used to pay for upgrading municipal water
systems and other infrastructure needs as area of origin towns grow,
251. For a thorough analysis of the issues regarding interbasin transfers and protection of the area
of origin, see Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Interregional Water Diversion, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1299
(1968).
252. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-118(b)IV (1973).
253. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 11460-11463 (West 1971); see also CAL. WATER CODE § 10505

(West 1971) ("county of origin" protection); Robie & Kletzing, Area of OriginStatutes-The California
Experience, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 419 (1979).
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perhaps as a result of farmers selling their water rights, giving up their
land, and moving to the cities. The fund also could be spent for improving water efficiency to maximize supplies and to secure instream
flows needed for protecting the area's capacity for recreational uses
and tourism. Like severance tax funds, which are used to compensate
for the impacts of energy development, the fund could help mitigate a
variety of social and economic effects of exporting water.
Even with mitigation, however, there are reasons for limiting the
total amount of water that can be exported from an area. Maintaining
streamflow is essential to preserve fish and wildlife habitat, to support
water-based recreation, and to satisfy aesthetic preferences that may
be the basis of local economies and lifestyles. Instream flow rights
may be necessary to sustain stretches of the Colorado or its tributaries
as a "live" stream. But instream values may be overlooked or treated
as unimportant when compared to many extrabasin uses. Only recently has western water law recognized the value of instream flows.
Now a number of states allow appropriations of streamflows for preservation of fish and wildlife habitat and for recreational needs.2 54 Incorporating appropriations for instream flows into the priority system
gives other users, including exporters, notice of the claims that affect
the stream and sets limits on how much water ultimately can be
diverted.
There is a legitimate interest throughout the area served by the
Colorado River in how all available water supplies are used. To the
extent water is conserved in Salt Lake City, more will be available in
Tucson. If Denver limits lawn watering, tourism may be able to flourish in Glenwood Springs. Thus, limits might be placed on exports by
insisting on conservation efforts in the importing region.
Just as there is an interrelationship between Basin and non-Basin
water sources, groundwater use is related to the use of River water.
Groundwater pumping with a direct hydrologic effect on the River
surely is included in the management regime established by the Law of
the River. While it went unmentioned in the 1922 Compact, the
Supreme Court interpreted related groundwater to be within the scope
of management authority in the Boulder Canyon Project Act. 2 " A
now common understanding of the fundamentals of hydrology demands that groundwater be regulated along with the river flow it af254. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973). See generally Tarlock, The Recognition
of Instream Flow Rights: "New" Public Western Water Rights, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1
(1979); J. BAGLEY, D. LARSON, & L. KAPALOSKI, ADAPTING APPROPRIATION WATER LAW TO AC-

COMMODATE EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS OF INSTREAM FLOW USES (1983) (Utah Water Research
Laboratory, Utah State University, Water Resources Planning Series No. UWRL/P-83/06).
255. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 347-50 (1964).
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fects.2 56 Colorado and New Mexico allocate "tributary" groundwater
as a part of the surface system to which it is connected.25 7
The use of groundwater by Basin states is important for River
management even if the groundwater source is not connected with the
River. Groundwater resources can be used to cushion the effects of
fluctuations in River flows on all water users, and careful development
and distribution of River water can prolong the life of nonrenewable
groundwater. As aquifers are depleted, greater burdens fall on the
Colorado River. Congress was aware of this prospect and in the 1968
Colorado River Basin Project Act2 58 it required conservation in
groundwater development.2 5 9 Before funds were appropriated to complete the long-awaited Central Arizona Project, Arizona had to show
that it was making significant efforts to conserve all its water resources.2 6 The state responded in 1980 by enacting one of the nation's strictest groundwater conservation laws.2 61 It gives strong
preference to municipal and industrial uses and aims at phasing out
agricultural uses.26 2

As demands on the River become more intense, Congress may
perceive a national interest in ensuring that all the waters of the Basin
states are wisely used. Federal legislation conceivably could invade
prerogatives traditionally reserved to the states by regulating groundwater allocation and use. That possibility was foreshadowed by a 1982
Supreme Court decision2 63 in which the Court stated "ground water
overdraft is a national problem and Congress has the power to deal
''264
with it on that scale.
It is becoming increasingly clear that each of the Basin states has
a legitimate concern with how the others manage all their available
water. Planning and water management within each state is, of
256. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE-FINAL REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

232-35 (1973).

257. Eg., Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975 (1951); Templeton v. Pecos
Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. 59, 332 P.2d 465 (1958); Trelease, Conjunctive Use of
Groundwaterand Surface Water, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1853, 1856-63 (1981).
258. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (1982).
259. 43 U.S.C. § 1524c (1982). See H.R. REP. No. 1312, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3666-87.
260. Connall, A History of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313,
315, 329-30; Johnson, The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act and Trends in Western States
GroundwaterAdministration and Management: A MineralsIndustry Perspective,26 ROCKY MTN.MIN.
L. INST, 1031, 1059-60 (1980); Weatherford, supra note 57, at 153, 158.
261. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -637 (Supp. 1984).
262. Id. § 45-147. The Act states a preference as between competing applications for water from
the same source for domestic uses over irrigation and stock-watering. See also Connall, supra note 260,
at 322.
263. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
264. 458 U.S. at 954.
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course, the sovereign right of the individual state, but if it is not exercised responsibly, the other states are affected. In order to maximize
supplies that are available to each state, and to have the benefit of
reciprocal concern by other states to the same end, it would serve the
seven Basin states well to cooperate extensively with one another in
formulating state plans and in carrying out management schemes, perhaps through a Basin-wide entity voluntarily formed by them. Failure
to do so may lead to federal intervention. Most basically, it is essential
for the states to undertake long-range planning. Only then will realistic projections of water needs and means for meeting them be identified. Each state depends on the others to plan and manage effectively,
and should be able to build their own plans on assumptions and projections made by their neighbor states. How a Basin state plans to
allocate its groundwater resources, its transbasin export restrictions
and area of origin protections, its plans for new water sources, and the
extent of instream flows it preserves all are important to other Basin
states. The states should regularly exchange information and solicit
other states' input in their planning. A cooperative effort should be
made in seeking ways to augment overall supplies as it becomes necessary to do so.
E. Interstate Markets
Markets can move natural resources to uses most valued by society, and the interdependence of all water sources in the Basin states
suggests that the West could be considered a single water "market."
Nevertheless, interstate transactions in Colorado River water face a
variety of legal and policy obstacles. Upper Basin states are concerned
that even "temporary" transactions could place today's excess water
beyond their future reach. The concern should be ameliorated by the
fact that the Law of the River contemplates temporary use by faster
growing states; the vitality of the law to terminate such temporary use,
even though another area may grow dependent on it, is being proven
as Arizona recaptures the share of its water which has been used for
years by California. Lower Basin states are concerned that if additional water were made available to any state or user, in amounts different from those provided by Compact, it would upset the scheme for
sharing water set by the Law of the River. If no states are unduly
harmed by a contractual arrangement, however, no objection should
be raised.
Several Basin states have enacted laws curtailing interstate ex-
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ports of water.2 65 To the extent such laws prevent water from going to

non-Basin states, they could reduce the potential demands on the
River and thereby benefit other Basin states. But the range of permissible embargo statutes is narrow. The United States Supreme Court
held in Sporhase v. Nebraska that laws regulating water export must
pass constitutional muster under the commerce clause, which implies
a bar on state legislation that interferes with interstate commerce.2 66
Export restrictions are permitted only when the state strictly regulates
water use within its own borders. Thus, only a state's even-handed
measures demanded by shortages to protect "the health of its citizens-and not simply the health of its economy," will be given
deference.2 67
Anti-export legislation needed to facilitate compliance with interstate compacts and federal legislation may not be subject to the same
limitations as other state statutes. The Constitution allows Congress
to restrain or regulate interstate commerce as it sees fit, or to authorize
the states to do so. Because Congress has allocated the interstate waters of the Colorado through legislation and compact approval, state
restrictions carrying out Congress's allocation scheme should not be
subject to usual commerce clause restraints. One court has held that
congressional consent to a compact effectively immunizes it from attack as an interference with interstate commerce.2 68 Congressional
approval of the 1922 Compact, and passage of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act and the Colorado River Basin Storage Project Act, create
a complex scheme that may require state action to implement it. Because all water use in the Basin states is interrelated, laws restricting
exports arguably could be related to the intricate scheme for River
management and water allocation. But the Supreme Court has suggested that congressional specificity about the need for state action
may be required to avoid the negative implications of the commerce
clause.2 69

Restrictions that relate restraints on exports to compliance with
compacts, legislation, and court decisions apportioning interstate waters bear a close relationship to the Law of the River. Colorado's stat265. Barnett, Mixing Water and the Commerce Clause: The Problems of Practice,Precedentand
Policy in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 161 (1984).
266. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 945-54.
267. Id. at 956.

268. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293, 297
(D. Mont. 1983).
269. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 960. Legislation introduced in the Ninety-ninth Congress would authorize states to regulate interstate transfers of water. H.R. 1510, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 131 CONG.
REc. 1171 (1985).
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ute, 270 revised in 1984 to comply with the Sporhase decision, requires
at least one of three findings by the water court. An export must be
specifically authorized by compact, result in a credit of exported water
as a delivery under a compact, or not impair the state's ability to comply with interstate apportionments. The law also requires a finding
that the export will not deprive Colorado citizens of beneficial uses of
waters allocated to the state by compact or decree.27 1 If tested, the
constitutionality of the Colorado statute will turn on a judicial determination that the state action in the particular case is authorized by or
necessary to carry out the complex arrangement of interstate rights
and obligations. An essential purpose for the compacts was to protect
a share of water for later development in the Upper Basin states. This
provides an added justification for a state to control exports which
could frustrate that end.
In the summer of 1984, a private corporation called the Galloway
Group proposed to develop water on the Yampa River, a Colorado
River tributary in Western Colorado, and to sell the water to the San
Diego County Water Authority (San Diego). San Diego is almost entirely dependent on River water delivered by the Metropolitan Water
District of southern California (MWD). San Diego lacks any significant undeveloped water sources and expects a cutback in available
MWD water when the Central Arizona Project enables Arizona to
make full use of its apportionment. San Diego paid $10,000 to buy an
option from Galloway which entitles it to enter into a water service
agreement. Under the agreement, Galloway would deliver 300,000500,000 acre-feet of water each year.2 72 The Galloway proposal illustrates some of the difficulties of an interstate export scheme.
The Galloway contract would privately bargain away some ten
percent of Colorado's total Compact allocation for at least forty
years-a term set without state or other public participation-perhaps
jeopardizing the purpose of the 1922 compact. Galloway asserts that
it need not comply with the export statute because it will use the water
it appropriates within Colorado for hydroelectric generation. But Colorado law provides that unauthorized actions leading to water export
may be enjoined.27 s
Galloway also could have trouble showing that the proposal does
not impair the state's ability to comply with interstate apportionments.
270. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-81-101 to -103 (Supp. 1984).
271. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-81-101(3)(c) (Supp. 1984).
272. Option Agreement and Exhibit A thereto between the Galloway Group, Ltd. and San Diego
County Water Authority (Aug. 1984); Controversial Plan to Buy Colorado Water, L.A. Times, Aug. 30,
1984, at Part 11cc, p.1.
273. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-102 (Supp. 1984).
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It is proposed that the water to be sent to San Diego will be charged
against Colorado's apportionment, and not credited as a delivery to
California (and the Lower Basin) in satisfaction of the Compact requirement. Thus, water otherwise available for Compact deliveries
would be sold purely for private gain.
There is no absolute legal prohibition of interstate exports in the
Colorado River Compact or the Upper Basin Compact. Yet it seems
clear that neither the Compact drafters nor Congress contemplated
exports. References to "use" in the Colorado River Compact27 4 imply
that the apportioned water will be used in the basin to which it is
apportioned. 275 Further, the guaranteed Upper Basin delivery of
75,000,000 acre-feet every ten years at Lee Ferry is framed as a prohibition against depletion of flows below that amount, 276 suggesting that
water apportioned to the Upper Basin should be used in the Upper
Basin.2 77 Finally, Article III(e) prevents withholding the Upper Basin's share of water from the Lower Basin if it cannot be used by the
Upper Basin for agricultural or domestic purposes; thus, there is little
reason for a Lower Basin state to purchase some of an Upper Basin
state's apportionment that cannot be used in the Upper Basin because
Article III(e) would require its release anyway.27 8
The law relating to the Lower Basin poses direct and formidable
obstacles to the use of one state's apportionment within another. Arizona v. California279 seems to preclude purchase by a Lower Basin
state of water to be charged against any other Basin state's apportionment. The Court said, "any mainstream water consumptively used
within a state shall be charged to its apportionment, regardless of the
purpose for which it was released." 2 8 ° The Court also decreed that
"[m]ainstream water shall be released or delivered to water users...
only pursuant to valid contracts made with such users by the Secretary
274. Article I; Article III(a)
and (b).
275. A state could provide for an out-of-state use to be a "use" under its own laws, however. Eg.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101(4) (Supp. 1984) sets conditions on exports in order for them to "be
recognized as a beneficial use for purposes of perfecting a water right."
276. Article 111(d).
277. As a practical matter, it would be possible to account for exports in addition to the guaranteed annual deliveries.
278. The Upper Basin should have the right to withhold reasonable amounts of water to store for

future uses. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. The Upper Basin could also agree not to
develop uses but to allow water to be delivered to the Lower Basin.
279. 373 U.S. 546 (1963); 376 U.S. 340 (1964).

280. 376 U.S. at 343. This declaration was made in the context of allocations of the Lower Basin's share of water among Lower Basin states, not of Upper Basin water to Lower Basin states. Yet the
Lower Basin states have a stake in how "surplus" Upper Basin water is allocated among them. If it is
surplus, it is shared equally; if it is considered water "used" by the Upper Basin (though under contract
with a particular Lower Basin user), it is not shared.
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of the Interior., 28 1 Deliveries of water through Hoover Dam or other
federal dams must be with the cooperation of the Secretary. Consent
is unlikely if a proposal would disrupt the established regime for regulating the River or interfere with federal statutory goals like flood control, power generation, or fish and wildlife protection. The Secretary
operates reservoirs in the Basin under operating criteria adopted by
regulation pursuant to law,28 2 which must conform to the Law of the
River.
The Galloway proposal raises problems because it is a contract
between private parties that attempts to reallocate waters that are subject to interstate compacts. Sound public policy, as well as considerations of integrity for the compacts, dictates that the states be parties to
any interstate allocation. Leases and other agreements that allow one
state to use water allocated to another may be, but probably are not,
interstate compacts requiring congressional approval.2 83
Although the Galloway proposal faces great legal obstacles, other
market transactions between states involving use of compacted waters
in the Colorado River Basin may be possible. Transactions that may
raise fewer legal issues include sales among Upper Basin states and
exports to non-Colorado River Basin states. Surely Upper Basin
agreements (like agreements of Indian tribes discussed earlier) are possible that would delay development, forego present uses, or employ
water conservation to reduce consumption. Still, it is unlikely that
Lower Basin interests would pay a state to delay or forego water use
unless the state were using or could present credible plans for using
the water. In such a case, Lower Basin users may pay for "insurance"
that an Upper Basin state will not develop the water for a specified
time.
The relationship among the Colorado River Basin states rests on
a delicate and carefully crafted foundation. The states view proposals
that threaten the integrity of their working relationship with suspicion.
Basin states may look favorably upon transactions offering benefits for
all concerned, but they will surely resist any departures from the Law
281. Id.
282. The Colorado River Basin Project Act requires the Secretary to adopt operating criteria to
regulate reservoir operations in the Basin. 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (1982). See Criteria for Coordinated,
Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs, 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (1970). The Secretary has
great discretion over the criteria. See supra notes 74 and 78.
283. Read literally, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3 could require the consent of Congress for every agreement
entered into between two states, even if the agreement were of no concern to the United States. But in
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), the Court held that congressional consent was only required
if the agreement would encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States. Arguably, a lease would not require consent unless it affected Congress's right to regulate commerce. See

generally Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and Congressional Consent, 36 VA. L. REV. 753 (1950).
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of the River and the practices that have grown up under it unless they
expect substantial mutual gains. A Lower Basin agreement to pay for
water apportioned to an Upper Basin state would be a tacit recognition of the validity of the Compact apportionment. But the established working relationship among all the states is sufficiently valuable
that no contractual arrangement for interstate water sales is likely
without the consent of all Basin states.
IV. CONCLUSION

Competition among traditional rivals for the Colorado River's copious benefits will continue, but practical arrangements, suited to the
diverse needs of the Basin states, must supplant neat legal arguments
and political rhetoric. The Upper and Lower Basin states may be pitted against one another anew as the slower growing mountain states
consume more of their apportioned share of River water, curtailing
the surplus that has helped California and Arizona to build their economies. Several interpretive questions may arise under the Law of the
River but their resolution may well turn on the nature of the uses that
depend on the water in question. The relative values of competing
water uses in the region's economy will move water to new uses
through consensual transactions and cooperation among the states and
with Indian tribes and water users within individual states. Capital
will move to states, Indian tribes and individuals with potential for
using their water productively; some states or water users will pay
other states or tribes to delay or avoid development. The negotiating
table and the marketplace are already replacing the courtroom as the
forums of choice in allocating River resources.
The nature of water uses in the Basin is evolving in response to
changing demographics and economics. Agriculture historically has
been the major consumer of Colorado River water. Marginal agriculture has difficulty remaining viable in the Basin as growing cities and
industries can produce greater returns from water now used in farming and ranching. Consequently, only municipal and industrial uses
and the highest-valued agricultural uses will be sustained. Another
change is that consumptive uses of the Colorado River are coming into
conflict with nonconsumptive uses. The newly-realized economic importance of recreation and of healthy fish and wildlife resources has
bolstered growing demands for a quality of life in the West that depends on protecting the natural environment. Leaving water in
stretches of the River will be increasingly understood to be an important use.
The importance of hydroelectric power generation by Colorado
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River facilities has grown with the price of power from other sources.
Great water projects on the River were originally built to aid agriculture by allowing repayment of costs to be made over long periods at
low interest rates. However, their costs are largely justified today, and
repaid to the federal treasury by revenues from their production of
electric power. Because power generation can conflict with a variety
of other uses-flood control, recreation, fish and wildlife, as well as
storage for irrigation and domestic supply-the federal government as
operator of the hydroelectric dams, should respond to state concerns
about these other uses. The Secretary of the Interior can respond by
broadening the state role in setting operating criteria for the Colorado
River reservoir system and Congress can respond by giving the states a
greater financial stake in power production.
The practical solutions to problems of allocating Colorado River
water are changing as demands change and increase. Construction of
facilities to store water for future use will remain important, but major
new projects are neither likely nor necessary. Irrigated agriculture is a
declining industry and cannot repay debts for publicly subsidized project costs, let alone sustain the burdens of privately financing new
projects. Municipal and industrial users can pay for projects but will
seek less costly approaches first. Future solutions will emphasize
greater sophistication in management and administration. Measures
to increase water efficiency, especially in agriculture, can make more
water available for new purposes, while sustaining existing uses and
the economies built on them. Capital will be attracted to the most
cost-effective development projects such as certain new Upper Basin
projects, repair of existing dams for safety and to maintain maximum
storage capacities, and measures to protect water quality and reduce
consumptive waste. Aggressive programs to reduce salinity in the
River are underway. Protecting water quality is especially important
to the Lower Basin where salt concentrations threaten to restrict the
usefulness of River water,
Two phenomena will be increasingly significant in allocating Colorado River water according to changing demands: greater application of market forces and Basin-wide cooperation. Economics will
play a larger role in distributing Colorado River water among competing users within states and across state lines. Transactions among
users can help to maximize the River's utility. As the value of water
increases, more efficient uses will be made, and investments in efficiency will be rewarded. Ultimately, Lower Basin users should be
willing to pay for further salinity reductions according to the increase
in value they will enjoy from the higher quality water. Marketing
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water across state lines could also help distribute it to the highest economic uses. However, significant legal obstacles to interstate arrangements will fall only if the benefits and burdens are distributed fairly
among the affected states and the states can integrate export of water
into their planning efforts. Water marketing must be tempered by
public policy considerations for noneconomic values such as preservation of rural communities and aesthetics. States must make tradeoffs,
realizing that protecting noneconomic values entails economic costs.
Decisionmaking on the River has moved away from the courts
and Congress and toward more interstate cooperation. The Colorado
River Salinity Control Forum illustrates the efficacy of Basin state cooperation in solving River problems. Disputes over legal interpretations and allocation issues can be resolved rather than heightened, and
River resources can be used for the greatest overall benefit through
negotiated agreements following the Salinity Control Forum model.
There should be a regular mechanism, perhaps a single seven-state
committee or forum, for interstate discussion of a variety of new proposals and long-standing issues. The difficulties in establishing such a
group are surely preferable to abdicating solutions to the federal
courts or to Congress.
Interstate arrangements must respect the interests and needs of
individual Basin states. For individual states to understand clearly
their own interests, they should develop their positions and plans with
the broadest possible public representation and participation. Free operation of markets and consideration of the public interest in state
water allocation decisions are both prerequisites if a state's overall interests are to be clearly articulated and protected in interstate dealings.

